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INTRODUCTION
- A. Statement of the problem
The subject of this thesis is the philosophy of religion of
William Ernest Hocking, Alford Professor of Philosophy at Harvard
University since 1920. Dr. Hocking's interests are broad and his
treatment is fresh and original. He writes in a certain vigorous
style which generally proves stimulating, but is often exceedingly
fragmentary and disconnected.
I have endeavored in the outline of the thesis to assemble
the points of thought which he himself has placed the most empha-
sis upon. They do not fall into a systemati? whole as easily as
I wish they did. What unity they possess may best be seen by ob-
serving in his treatment of them all a certain principle, the
movement of which he has developed in a very original and suggest-
ive way. At the point of its clearest expression he has called it
the princiole of a lt ernat ion . Though used at times with a certain
large freedom this principle is distinctive and fundamental to his
thought. I have given it the name dialectic, and have endeavored
to show It as the unifying principle or thread of his system.
However, much greater emphasis must be placed on the subject mat-
ter than uoon this dialectic principle.
The philosophy of Hocking is, as one of his critics says, a
"'Tjioiified idealism".' His background is Influenced considerably
by Hegel and Royce. He also shows a very distinct, though some-
what unsatisfactory personallst ic tendency. I have not attempted
to formulate a statement of the central motif of hi3 philosophy.
#
But his great problei. La to probe experience in an effort to dis-
cover the extent to which it yields answers to the problems of
philosophy. At the center of experience he finds God, and also
certain suggestions which he throws out as probable leads in solv-
ing the problems.
The task of this thesis is to attempt a unification of his
loosely connected and often fragmentary considerations and to est(~
"irtate thtfir significance.
1. Its purpose and significance
The thesis ha.- w©~ purpose , --that of aoorcciation and
of criticism. Today America stands in need of sane and wholesome
idealistic thinking, and a thorough study of such men as Hocking
ought to be well worth while. It strikes one as a sad fact that
this nation, once distinctly religious at heart, should become
;
to
the eyes of the rest of the world; one of the most materialistic
of all nations, ""e of America may not be ready to agree with all
that the worlj says about us, yet we have given ! it much cause
for such an estimate.
At least we must admit that not idealism but pragmatism or
lnstrumentalism, a distinctly posit ivistic ohilosophy, has the
honor of being considered the great American philosophy. It is
difficult to see in this philosophy any permanent foundation for
a vital religion. At best its religion is vague and colorless,
while we gladly agree that James contributed much to the psychol-
ogy of religion and was in fact a religious apologist, yet John
Dewey, the leader of pragmatism in its present popular form, is
quite indifferent to all religion. William James was an except-
ion among the positivists.

yeo-realism, another positivistic philosophy enjoying some
popularity at the present time, is perhaps even less friendly to
religion. Eertrand Russell, its English exponent, is distinctly
hostile, while Perry is somewhat more friendly, put "realism
e: 3lioitly reoudiates every spiritual and moral ontology". It
2
has no place for an abiding God. Humanlsm^which is having great
vogue at the present time, also rejects religion in its tradit-
ional theistic form. Humanism i3 uncertain just what part relig-
ion should play in society. These and other naturalistic systems
find a ready hearing among a people already possessed with the
scientific spirit. As a whole such philosophies are shallow and
uncritical and often rest upon a false notion of religion and
metaphysics
.
Professor Hocking is a wholesome and steadying Influence
against these more shallow and transitory, popular philosophies.
kt the s - me time his ability to appreciate the true significance
of then is remarkable. He carries this splendid quality almost
to a fault. AsO.tJe "-elincourt says of him,
"Professor Hocking has a most refreshing habit of ex-
pounding a theory as if it were his own and establishing it
apoarently to his own satisfaction, and then, without having
prepared us for it in any way, of turning and rending it--
though never without doing Justice to its legitimate content-
ions. So gre&t indeed is his power of sympathetic inter-
pretation of other theories, and so much validity 13 he pre-
pared to allow them, that it is not easy to decide where his
own sympathies lie." 3
2. Its limits
Within the limits of such a paper as this, one csn scarcely
give adequate treatment to the broad system of philosophy found in
Professor Hocking's writings. Many Important implications of his
#•
thought are undoubtedly omitted. His scope is so broad and com-
prehensive that we are often disappointed at his brief and frag-
mentary treatment of some of the fundamental problems of religion.
He has but a brief treatment of such basic problems as those of
immanence and transcendence. Any discussion of such problems as
faith, love and forgiveness, are almost if not wholly lacking.
The problem of sin, although treated with freshness and original-
ity seems inadequate. In regard to punishment he ee ;ms in a mea-
sure of doubt as to its function and worth. The problem of immor-
tality is almost entirely avoided, while his theory of freedom,
though well defined^ receives but fragmentary and scattered treat-
4
ment
.
Professor Hocking is much more interested in presenting and
powerfully illustrating his doctrine than in proving it. The
reader has the feeling that the proof for which he eagerly seeks,
often remains just out of reach.
On the whole his discussions are powerful and persuasive,
but suggestive rather than assertive; he is never dogmatic.
Thile attempting a few deductions from his general inferences I
have not felt safe In straying too far from his own lines of
argument. Thus some problems important to any thorough philosophy
of religion will not receive treatment here in proportion to their
importance.
E . Materials and methods
There are two distinct sources of materials used in the pre-
paration of the present paper. The first is the writings of
Professor Hocking himself. The other Is composed of reviews, com-
ments and critical materials compile 3 from lists of periodicals

and contemporary works in the fields of philosophy, psychology,
religion and ethics.
The one "book which contains most nearly Hocking's philosophy
of religion is his The Meaning of G-od in Human Exp erience
,
printed
first in 1912, reprinted in 1913 and again in 1916. Human Nature
and Its Remaking contains much of his ethical theory, and Man and
the "t at
e
,
his political theory. His most recent book, Type3 of
Philosophy
, is valuable in giving the author's final statement of
his philosophical position. His system of thought is fairly con-
sistent throughout the period of these publications. 5
Hocking is varied and individual in style, bordering at times
on carelessness. Though not confined to any one method he may be
said in general to reason inductively. He is also fond of the
Emersonian style: --the cluster method. Unfortunately both of these
are difficult for a beginner to master and are not easily arranged
in orderly topical outline. I have found difficulty in adapting
his argument to the latter method. It has al3o been difficult to
keep the tone of the paper sufficiently normat ive--another fault,
perhaps, of the beginner. Not a review, nor yet a criticism, but
primarily an appreciation of the "'ork of Hocking has been the aim
of the paper. Critical material 1$ for the most part left until
the end of each chapter or between main sections of the argument.
•
CHAPTER I
ROOTS OF RELIGION
A. Notion of instinct
The notion of instinct comes from an attempt to discover the
hidden sources of human nature. Contrary to the idea of Rousseau
that this "original" nature could be Isolated and described as dis-
tinct from it3 environment, we must hold to a more abstract inter-
pretation. <*!e arrive at our notion of original nature from a hy-
pothetical definition of those elements in life which show a de-
gree of constancy, independent of changing conditions. "Instinct"
is used to denote, not that part of heredity which is peculiar to
the individual, but that part which is peculiar to the human race.
It forms the starting point for 8 study of human nature. This
view of instinct is naturalistic in as far as man becomes the re-
sult of a series of living forms on the earth. 6
Such a notion of Instinct contains first of all a picture of
the biological mechanism of nerves and muscles by means of which
an organism is able to react to its environment. Thi3 reaction is
such as tends to promote the continuation of the species, charac-
terizing its ways of life. Though these habitual responses are
imperfect without practice they are effective from the beginning
without either experience or instruction.
The 'stimulus' of action appears at first as an object of per-
ception. It carries with it a presupposition or a pre-percept ion
•
of a certain type of response: an "anticipatory meaning" for the
perceiving organism. This may "be either positive or negative.
Mr. Hocking thinks that the first sight of a pond of water must
have some such meaning to the gosling. The same stimulus to the
chick would receive an entirely negative response. This is not an
a priori knowledge, rather an a priori expectation. The orderly
development of this stimulus-response pattern "becomes a vital part
of the life of the organism: it undergoes modifications through
experience, and ultimately becoming an individualized habit. ^
1. The Range of Instinct
In early life human equipment seems very slender, being marked
by an absence of fixed traits. In animals other than man the in-
stincts seem much more pronounced^ due , V.r. Hocking thinks, to a
remarkable bodily structure together with an absence of the higher
conditioning powers of the human mind. Difficulty in discovering
the coarser criteria of human Instinct is not due to the fact that
they do not exist. Eut it is due to the setting off, or balancing
of one instinct against another, to the infinite variety of pattern
which any instinct may assume, and to the overlapping of the In-
stincts. These three causes operating together make way for the
infinite variety of response patterns.
It is not wise to attempt an harl and fast enumeration of the
instinct s^becaus e of their great complexity. In general each posi-
tive instinct has its negative counterpart: viz . , domination, sub-
mission. ?ir3t to appear are the simple and primary instincts of
physical activity. Then come the positive instincts of food get—*
ting, curiosity, and sociability: sex-love coming under the latter.
p
pugnacity and fear are negative and are found as a part of all
other instincts: curiosity and play are "general" positive ln-
8
stinct s.
Professor Hocking seems unsatisfied with any arbitrary class-
ification of the instincts. He seeks rather some unifying prin-
ciple back of them all. Around this central principle he grou;_s
the "necessary interests" of life. These pervade and direct the
whole list of the more fragmentary impulses and reactions. "They
would Cep end, " he says, "not on specific routing of nervous energy,
but on the nature of the nervous system itself. " It is these ne-
cessary interests that are at once the most significant and the
most obscure of original human tendencies, and are summed up in the
idea of self preservation, the "will to live", or the "will to
t. 9power". 7
The problem of instincts is a difficult one and is far from
being agreed upon. It is here that Hocking parts company with the
cruder naturalistic view and rlth Behaviorism. Dr. McDougall has
answered the problem by describing what he calls "purposive be-
havior". This is a long step in advance r oj-_ the materialists.
Eut the question remains, how far back can you carry the concept
of purpose into the dawning of instinct? 10 Professor perry comes
forward with the idea of logical necessity. ^ Dr. Edgar Pierce
with his panpsychist lc or mentalistlc theory would explain these
dawning instincts, and subsequently the fully flowered personality,
by the word "process". All comes from the backlying mental ground
of existence. He thinks that to suggest an a priori principle
1
P
which points to an Absolute only pushes the problem farther away.
Eut brushing away all other theories as incomplete and unsatisfactory
i•
Is exactly what Professor Hocking seems intent on doing. Eack in
the indistinct and difficult beginnings of individuality Hocking
finds an Other. Is this the recourse of those who fear to think
through? Or is it rather the only sane solution.
2. The will
In the unitary self all experiences are referred to a common
interest. The idea of good, though often lying in the subconscious,
dominates this common Interest: and thus, experience becomes a
selective process, continually seeking a better good. Each unitary
self acquires an interpretation of its own good, i.e., its dominant
interest. This may be stated as the will to live 'as a man', in-
adequately interpreted by the Nietzschian phrase as the "will to
power". The different instincts are but manifestations of this
unifying principle. The food-getting instinct is an active im-
pulse in this direction. The play instinct seems to be but
"practice in mastery". Fear is this impulse on its negative side.
And sex-love primarily is "potency In search of a sanction".
True, Nietzsche was mistaken, but not in his que3t . He took
the idea of the will to power to be completely adequate, whicn was
a mistake. To him this power could only be attained at the ex-
pen3 a of love to mankind, whereas the two are Inseparable. Hocking
also gives acknowledgement to Freud in his similar search for a
dominant interest of life, though he failed to find an adequate
1"*
answer.
Though the will to power is an inadequate expression of the
thought he has in mind, he adopts it "as a working name for the
instinctive center of the human will". Eut now that we have come
face to fac= with will, how shall we analyze will? Here Hocking

introduces something new. Human instincts, from the standpoint of
physical theory, are such stuff as the solar systems are made of.
But from the metaphysical standpoint they are such stuff as dreams,
ideas, and reasoning are made of. But will must do something, it
must release energy. This output of will comes to us as feelings,
desires. "Feeling is a mass of ideas at work within us." it is
our experience of mental activity. It is the point at which the
self realizes itself in the process of apprehending reality. ^
Thus we return to a more careful survey of fe sling, more
particularly for this paper, the religious feeling.
B . Peeling
There are three currents of thought which demand that the
validity of our ideas be treated by some higher court of appeal.
(1) Psychology is quite in agreement that "nothing is real unless
it belongs to conscious experience". (2) Biologists think that
"only in the form of feeling can consciousness accompany the or-
ganism". (3) For the Pragmatist, the thing which works is the
real, the valuable. This emphasis on value-consciousness as against
fact -consciousness tends to assign a higher degree of reality to
feeling than to idea. In these three feeling becomes the test and
15ground for our ideas. **
But* the deepest of all feelings are religious. The religious
motive contains the secret of all costly and "death involving"
loyalties such as loyalty to the ~tate, or to any noble cause.
Professor Hocking thinks it is "man's leap, as an individual and as
species, for eternal life in some form, in presence of an awakened
fear of fate". Here the will to live is equivalent to this deep
religious feeling. They are not two facts but one. Incidentally
•
It would seem that the fear motive which is considered by Hocking
as a negative instinct would be hardly sufficient ground for this
greatest of human motivations. Perhaps he did not intend it to be
considered as such. But a noble idealism will call out "death-in-
volving" loyalties as quiclsjand efficiently as will fear.
m he history of religion, he points out, has been an inter-
pretation of feeling. But the question arises, Does this experience
which arises in feeling (of one kind) also end in feeling (of per-
haps another)^ Is feeling justified by feeling or does it rise in
something essentially different? 1
I. Limitation of feeling
Though religion may be permeated with feeling it has always
been a feeling which has concerned itself about truth, purpose, and
metaphysical reality. It has beenjfeelinf about the universe and
the relation of the universe to the self. The strength of the
prophet has been a strength built upon selflessness in the face of
an overpowering conviction of the reality of God to whom he is
obligated. If the prophet is mistaken then practically the whole
of religion becomes a profound self-deception. It is only the
reality of the objective Other which gives strength and authority
to the individual personality. A mere series of sensations will
scarcely support the superstructure of a personality, or the still
deeoer implications of a metaphysical ground for the world. ^
a. The field of the intellect
To my mind this intimation of the need of an objective reality
ia Important and fundamental, and it is the basis of all Theism.
The tremendous amount of energy expended by human beings throughout

the centuries in establishing and defending the intellectual in-
gredients of religion ha-s not been in vain but has established
to the satisfaction of e:-ch advancing generation this profound
conviction that the ideal i_s the Peal. The Being worthy of praise
is infinitely more than the obj ect if icat Ion of human desire. The
cry of the heart is not one of despair but of hope. Here is where
we must firmly and definitely part company with certain of our con-
temporary prophets. The controversy is paging between Theism and
a vague, groundless positivism which denies in effe3t both idealism
and freedom, leaving but little place for man in its soulless
universe. But it is not all e^.sy traveling for the idealist, for
here we will note what Hocking points out as a fundamental dilemma
in the theory of religion: As has been intimated, not only is there
an essential Otherness about religion but there is also, on the
subjective side, idea, as well as feeling. ^
b. The conflict of feeling and idea
Man must ever attempt what seems to be impossible. He must
endeavor to interpret his Object of religion into thought. He
must give it meaning. In so doing he risks on the one hand the
danger of running into vague and content less speculation, and on
the other, of bringing his Object so low that it becomes an
apology for every human weakness. At the same time Object and sub-
ject are separate, for the religious Object is not identical with
his world, neither with human beings.
Professor Hocking finds this fundamental dilemma clearly re-
flected in the history of speculative thought as a great schism.
In the Middle Ages it became clearly articulate in the cleavage
between the Scholastics on the one hand and the Mystics on the

other. The problem Is also clearly represented in the thought of
Kant. In psychology it is the problem of feeling on the one hand
and cognition on the other. Recent conclusions in the field of
psychology give us a clue to the solution of the dileunia: here the
19problem is no longer either--or^ but becomes bot
h
-- £nd . j -
c. The destiny of feeling
The previous discussion has in a measure presupposed Hocking's
idea as to the destiny of feeling.
Feeling taken alone is something of a closed circle or rather
an infinite succession of such circles. It seeks its satisfaction,
but Immediately ceases uoon the realization of its goal. But that
is not final, for, "one feeling debouches in another, or the
appeasement of one hunger sets in motion the spring of another.
Thus emotion maintains a perpetual circle while life lasts". This
closed circle is self-destructive in that it finds no resting
place^-no ultimate set isfact ion. It never gets beyond itself.
In seeking to get out of this circle we turn to that other
element in feeling, namely Idea. TJow ideas seek expression, the
end of which is "animated cognizance" of their object. Thus
Hocking contends that "all positive feeling reaches its ter-
minus in knowledge. " And "Religion as feeling must aspire to com-
plete transformation of all its emotion into 3 present knowledge
20
of its desired object, whatever that may be". In our study of
the roots of religion we have one further problem: ^in and its
intimate relation to what we know as conscience.
0. Conscience
Conscience seems to be an elemental deposit in man's original
nature. It is that moral factor which is to be found as an element

of feeling. Though, it has a broad corporate value, we cannot think
of conscience as merely a result of the moral development of the
social life. Society may present the idea of obligation, but every
Individual must catch for himself the response which he is expected
to make. The awakening come3 from within.
Conscience "is not seeking neighbors but authorities". It
seems to be distinct from other innate tendencies, yet it runs along
with them, and it is the "principal inner agency for the remaking of
human nature". 21 Conscience is not an instinct; its office is that
of judge, and its function, the integration of the instinctive life.
It is in dealing with sin that this great moral nature comes to its
full expression.
1. Fallacies regarding sin
Two fallacies in the current conception of sin may be pointed
out. The old idea that one lie makes a liar or that one sin makes
a sinner ^though logically tenable has great difficulty in coming to
clear articulation in life. Neither are we inclined to agree with
those posltivists for whom merit cancels all sign of guilt. The
difficulty, Professor Hocking points out, lies in our misunder-
standing of the locale of conscience. In physical things two
opoosltes may neutrali7e each other. Eut in conscience both com-
oonents are retained without neutralization. This gives to con-
sciousness its tremendous depth. He calls this the fallacy of
22
cancellat ion.
The second fallacy is that of custom, '"e have learned so
much about 3in and the psychology of the abnormal that we can better
understand the sinner than the less common saint. This has its
philosophical expression in the presuppositions of modern naturalism
I
that whatever Is natural is right. Because it is human to err we
cannot conclude that error is not error. This would abolish the
category of sin. 2^
2. The nature of sin
In the first place we must be confident that there is nothing
In the original equipment of human nature which taken by itself
could be called sin. To be crude is not sin. "Sin.... is the re-
fusal to interpret crude impulse in terms of the individual's most
intelligent will to power. " 24 It is the "deliberate failure"
to be the best we can be. It is to be admitted that the crude im-
pulses are crude
; i.e., the impulse to kill, to fight, and the sex
instinct. The 'natural way' for a boy is to fight with his fists.
These crude impulses could not be used today. To use another
writer's phrase, the sins of todocj are the "outworn goods of yes-
terday". The moral quality of an im-ulse is due Somehow oo its
"mental environment". This leads us back to the idea of the cent-
ral thread of instinct which we have called the will to power, or
desire. It is here, Hocking thinks, that the moral character of
the issue arises. It arises from a conflict, not betwe?n two or
more individuals, but between the immediate demand and the wider
meaning which the impulse 'ought' to carry. There is, in fact,
no descriptive difference between the act which is sinful and the
act which is not sinful: "sin has all the o25;/Ghologica 1 ingred-
ients of virtue, and virtue all the ingredients of sin". 25
In answering the question, How, if this be true, can we have
any solidarity ill our social organization of law and order? he ad-
mits "certain kinds of objective behavior which are so far below
the level of average human interpretative power that we can assume
m
with all wub complete certainty that the objective wrong lmolies a
subjective vrong"
,
leaving room for the fact that "strong evidence"
might still convince us of the contrary. "It is in fact," he says,
"far safer to assume that an externally anti-social "behaviour is
internally sinful than that an externally correct behavior is in-
ternally virtuous . " rD
3. The status of sin
Thus far in the discussion we have found nothing which could be
called 'original sin 1 : "Every man is his own Adam". To make sin a
necessity wouli remove its sinfulness. Sin is failure to. reach what
is within my po^er to reach. Thus it is impossible to explain sin.
For to explain it would show it as a necessity, the result of de-
finable conditions, ^e work out the problem of sin along the line
of moral and social development. ~ince society is imperfect, we
partake of sin by being a member of society. To take the negative
path an^ 3 eny society would not be to escape sin^for that would be
a shirking of moral responsibility to our fellow man. Man must
strive andschieve, but this involves the possibility of evil. In
order to gain truth we risk error- he who will not risk a fall
fall3 by his cowardice. But always on the side of right are a-
vailable the two great forces for the remaking of human nature--
conscience anl the central will to power.^7
In the psychological sense we recognize the universality of
error, ^ur interest in holiness is not sufficient to cause us to
make the effort necessary in attaining it. ,pe are satisfied with
less, and thus apart from our part icular^dee is we recognize in our
moral consciousness something akin to a status of sin. While
Professor Hocking does not know what this entails, he is not
c
prepared to say that it entails nothing. Though he might not be
willing to call it depravity, he will not call it holiness. Eut
,
it might be argued, is it not the nature of things thus to be? It
is natural that man should be sinful and mortal. I need not repent
nor do I care to be immortal. I prefer just to be natural. To this
he replies that "If by nature man is evil," it still remains "that
evil is not all of him". His deepest longing is to overcome death.
The cry of his soul is for the "divine spark". in his awareness of
and effort to rise above the purely natural, we see man at his full
stature .
^
The metaphysical implications which have suggested themselves
in the course of this chapter on religious beginnings will be de-
veloped later. Let us briefly summarize and point out a few in-
ferences and conclusions.
Summary and Conclusion of chapter
Instincts may be separated for analy3l3»but in actuality are
varying manifestat ion? of one central will to power, or will to
exist. This will expresses the energized self. It ends in mental
activity (intellection) of two forms, feeling and cognition. But
there is an external world into which the self is made to fit, and
cognition infers that two minds have agreed. Thus the first sig-
nificant fact to note here i3 that Professor Hocking drops quickly
the field of positivism and enters the metaphysical. Obviously he
has a leaning towari a metaphysical a priori foundation for in-
stinct. It is but one step and that a very small one from this a
priori to the a oriori religious instinct as outlined by Rudolph
Otto. 29 i am convinced that a careful study would reveal many
ooints in common between the two men.
Perhaps the most important point to note in the chapter is the

rapidity with which Hocking gets under way with his dialectic of
experience. It first appears In showing the necessary alternation
between feeling and idea. experience must continually pass from one
to the other. He also uses it in his conception of the relation of
man to his environment and to his world. This amounts to an a priori
principle. It will be more completely developed in the course of the
study.
With Hocking's treatment of the problem of sin I am not fully
prepared to agree. He doe3 not wish to ground sin as an original
deposit in human nature, yet he places conscience there. But what
meaning wouli conscience have without sin? And is conscience to be
found in human nature prior to sin? For Hocking sin is distinctly
dis-value; it is failure to achieve. Put does this exhaust its
meaning? I am asking if it is merely weakness and ignorance with
which the will to achieve must contend, or is there such a thing
as an evil will? I cannot be satisfied with his complete silence
at this point.
These are difficult questions. For the present we shall have
to leave them and turn with Hocking to the more empirical task of
studying the evidences of religion as found in the on-going pro-
cesses of society.

CHAPTER II
RELIGION IN SOCIETY
A. The Religious Person
The value of religion and its transforming power is not to be
judged "by the fact that it has failed to make a world of saints.
It has made 3ome saints. The question of its possible power needs
no more proof than a single positive success.
It does not take a philosopher to distinquish the false note
of insincerity from the true flame of a pure soul, which behaves in
all manner of experiences with an illumination and poise that gives
at once an impression of superiority with a corresponding lack of
self-assertion. There is no sign of conflict or 3train. It has
mastery and a fascination over which the world never ceases to
wonder. "Purely," declares professor Hocking, "the religious spirit
Is living as if immortality were its share". 1
Art is long, but religion has an immediacy about it: morality
is never finished jDut religion say 3
y
""be ye perfect even as your
Father in Heaven is perfect". "There is no law of learning for
morality." 2 "Religion is anticipated attainment." '
B. Religion the Mother of the Arts
Here we are to view religion in the role of "perpetual
parentage" to the Art a.which are in a state of "perpetual depend-
ence". Religion is the spirit, the emotion or insight which is
the soul of Art. There is little, Hocking thinks in whet we call

culture that has not at sometime been purely a religious function.
The Arts have been conceived and nurtured in the bosom of religion.
Though today everytning is vigorously asserting its Own-ness and
independence, religion realises itself as the point at which all
instincts and feelings meet. It is these feeling3 and insights
which compose the soul of all art. The creativity which makes art
live is precisely that which religion calls out In us.^"
In his Ciapter on Art and Human Mature professor Hocking
emphasizes the essential creativity of art. In creating beauty
art becomes the interpreter of the central thread of Instinct.
"Beauty," he 3ays, "is reality offering a glimpse of the solution
of Its own problems of evil It must return from time to time
to the school of asceticism and religion." ^ in itself art is
insufficient^ for it tends toward independence, resulting in the in-
evitable loss of its vision. Here we get another application of
the principle- of alternation) in which the creative principle is
represented as alternating between its ideal and its creative work.
Eoth art and religion point beyond this world of becoming to
the world of being. They keep ever before man both an adequate
and an attainable objective. Peing beyond society, art has been
largely free from the limitations of an imperfect society.
*
In contrast to this the "acred Law, though it caught the idea of
authority, often made very crude and imperfect applications of it
in building up its ancient codes. ?
G. Theory of the 'State
Plato and Aristotle demonstrated the close harmony which
political science and statecraft have with any complete philosophy
of lire. Put long before their time the minstrels and sages placed
•
side by side their maxims of social and religious relationships.
Indirectly we may say that the chief function of the "tate is
the making of history. This making of history is rather remote
from any aim of which citizens either Individually or collectively
are aware. In fact a ~tate could not proceed with that purpose
consciously in mind. History appears as the incident ^not the aim.
""hen we ask for the ultimate aim of this function of history making,
we find it is neither for the sake of preservation of the State nor
for the sake of society, as these concepts taken alone are mere
fict ions--empty abstractions. Put the State's aim in its history-
making process is "the making of men". "it cannot make men,"
Professor Hocking contends, "without the long circuit of history."
Hocking conceives of the State as the personification of that
ideal of perfect attainment toward which man as an individual is
striving, ^e have previously shown that the highest attainment of
the individual lies in the direction of the will to power. The
State is an enlargement of this will: social action continues and
amplifies the work of individual experience: and history preserves
it for posterity.
Life demands that man should contract or bargain away certain
desired goods to society that he might receive other goods more de-
sirable to himself. He never loses Interest in these fa-rmtr goods
.
for he realizes that they must all be retained in order to insure
the value of his own goods. It is the purpose of the State to
supply this necessary unity to the total value. However, it must
be recognized that the "!tate can only supply the form or shell;
can only concern itself with physical action. The will to preserve
values and goods must come from within the individual. 9 Thus I
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strive toward the ideal in a situation in which "iwhet others wish
me to be must be identical to what I myself wish to be/ . ®
Hocking continually pictures the Hate as the prototv£ of the
ideal Individual. As in the individual all different interests and
goods are unified, so in the State, as an ideal individual, all
values are ideally united and conserved. In society where each man
is striving for mastery of the ideal through his will to power there
arises as a result the great field of competition. But "every com-
petitive interest must be so transformed or interpreted as to be
non-competitive, or an ingredient in a non-competitive Interest."
This la an absolute necessity for the preservation of the corporate
life. Thus, Hocking contends, "It is this necessity which produces
the political Hate. The 'Hate is the objective condition through
which a non-compot it lve satisfaction of the will to po^er becomes
possible . " 11
Perhaps this gives us a glimpse into the reason why a man will
offer his life for the Hatej u*hy all men, in fact^ require the
Hate, "as a Third Eeing whose power is their power, whose immort-
ality is their immortality "--the ideal Hate in which man can see
magnified a thousand fold the image of his own infinite possibili-
ties. These hypotheses --t ne necessity of cooperation with com-
petition, of division with unification, and of the ob J ect i f icat ion
of the ideal man into a personified ideal Hate: all implying this
world of Becoming and the world of Being--toget her with the pro-
blems which they rs ise from the theme of tfan and the Ha te . Its
significance for philosophy lies in this theory of the Hate as a
type- £ conserver and perfecttfr of all human values.
/-?
There is but one theory of the Hate to which thi3 stands
opoosed which we wish to mention. It is that which treats the
•
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group consciousness or group mind as having real existence,
metaphysical or otherwise. Many attempt to apply such a theory
in their search for an adequate ground for social unity and sol-
ilarity, without resorting to a theistic position. This view is
14having considerable vogue at present.
1. Education
Education has a two-fold function. It must communicate the
type, —those goods which have been accumulated by history: and it
must anticipate growth beyond the type. The process has two phases.
The child should first be given something posit ive : --the best of the
type. This stimulates the d evelopment of his will and lays the
foundation from which it operates. After that is accomplished he
may be given room for freedom in the realm where dangers are met,
and values are risked, in the hope of attaining new and better
values. ~ociety has but dimly recognized that thf directive func-
"I c
tion is the only true aim of education. * 3
It is not In the vortex of the maddening whirl of knowledge,
or in the intricacy of technique, that truth is generally discovered.
Rather it is out on the borderland where through self-elimination
and restriction of the field of interest the seeker ultimately
touches that Power which alone is the source of wisdom. But the
microscopic or technical, and the broad, borderland viewpoints are
both necessary: to have one without the other is death. We must
alternate between th«= two poles: now the vision, the relaxation,
the clear sir, the far horizon of the mountain top: now the mad
whirl of the valley with its masses of jostling humanity and the
m
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cold^cruel facts of existence as they actually are. But let us
approach the subject from another angle.
2. Punishment
Punishment is the negative side of education. Because we must
recognize the imperfection and incompletfn'ess of any given social
system, Hocking concedes the right of rebellion. The task of soc-
iety lies in seeking to decide whether the outbreak is rebellion or
common crime, according to the sincerity of the impelling motive.'
Hocking points out the great difficulties which lie in the way of
apprehending and punishing the true criminal in a way that will not
destroy those precise values which are to be preserved. I omit the
line of argument but quote in part his final paragraph.
"Thus in the negative work of punishment as in the positive
work of education, society seems to depend for the last quasi-
miraculous touch of efficiency without which the rest of its work
has a ring of hollowness and sham, upon an agency or agencies be-
yond its own borders."^
3. Harmony of State and Church
It has been pointed out that the 3tate can deal only with
material good. But complete satisfaction of man's will to power
can be found only in dealing with ultimate good. This the Church
has always proposed to do. It need not imply conflict, for all
goods come through the same sources in experience. In fact,
Professor Hocking thinks that "historically organized re-
ligion has reinforced the will of the State".
Religion calls for a recurrent abandonment of the world in
favor of the absolute good. It also demands that if the insight
and energizing so obtained by the will is to become of any per-
•
manent worth it must "make good In action". % it ho at the State,
religion is empty: without religion the ;tate is blind, anemic,
incohesive. Religion and politics together constitute a func-
tional unity for the will to power: the will demands both cir-
cuits for the normal function of its life! 15
Religion in developing "that part of human nature from which
the very conception of law originates— conscience" has a great
corrective function. Disappointed with it 3 failures, the Will for-
gets the world through the power of a fresh vision; it returns, and
recasts itself in a new attempt to produce the ideal by eliminating
the former mistakes and errors. This is the principle of alterna-
tion.
Hocking places "conscience" as the mean between worship on the
one hand and law on the other. While law is the highest rule of the
"tate, the Church demands its freedom. Its authority must be wholly
spiritual, wholly from within 'thus it carries within Itself its de-
vice for purification. Only thus can it speak with authority as the
voice of God. On the other hand the "tate can compel obedience
while the Church may act In an advisory capacity only, depending
upon the law of Individual conscience. Again, the "*tate may not
promote religion. The greater is its need of religion, the more
must it depend uoon the freedom of religion to supply that need.
But the Church may address the ?tate in reference to questions
which concern the moral or spiritual well-being of society. The
State on its part should encourage religious Interest and remember
its own religious obligations. Professor Hocking points out that
there is a limit to the extent to which the State may be tolerant
of religion, which, because of its high and independent position,
is of all institutions the most subject to abuse. "The corruption

of the best is the worst."
Every "tate, he thinks, is based upon a particular religious
type, not religion in general; therefore certain other cults must
be forbidden as being intolerable to the welfare of that ~tate.
He pleads for a more wholesome friendly relationship of Church and
3tate. "Then the separation is too complete and mutual they both
lose, '^hen the Church is assigned purely to other-worldly activity
it loses the sense of its "practical importance and passes through
an era of marked feebleness." 1 ®
D . The unifying of history
"Positive religion," say3 Professor Hocking in his concluding
chapter of the yeaning of God: "^sitive religion in its primitive
phases makes history possible . " it is the great religious con-
sciousness of man which steers life in the upward way. Nature has
its value. It is persistent and unified, but too indifferent for
human needs^j it is not sufficient to incite a man to the attainment
of the ideal. It lacks the authority of the categorical imperative.
This is supplied ever afresh by the prophetic consciousness which
unifies and mobilizes the streams of life, organizing society for
the attainment of values and the working out of destiny.
Professor Hocking further points out four striking facts per-
taining to religious development. As religion becomes world-over-
coming, it also becomes independent from national life, begins a
universal propaganda, and refers itself and its adherents to some
distinctive historical object or pareon from which it takes its
origin.15
While it is not quite evident to us that these qualities are
essentially different from tho3e of any purely human institution

yet we can see the point he Is trying to make. Religion has some-
thing of permanence, and independence, and author it y, and universal-
ity about it which all other human institutions, even the 'State,
seem to lack. Religion stands as a lighthouse built upon the
solid rock guiding the ships of State over the tossing, changing
seas of time. It is the great unifying agency of all tlme^— per-
manence in the midst of change; unity in the mid3t of chaosj cer-
tainty in the midst of doubt, --this is the function of the Church
in society.
Conclusion of chapter
The State has ev=r been historically the one great rival of
the Church. The progress of Hocking's dialectic through this re-
lationship is fresh and suggestive. In stating his view of the
proper relationship between Church and ~tate he has dared to break
with one of our strongest American traditions. Complete separat-
ion of Church and State has Its dangers. He has seen and pointed
them cut. I believe his criticism is timely. As a nation we are
only beginning to sense the grave dangers of too great^separatlon.
^either can exist without the other, and without being in some type
of organic union with 3t her
.
"econd only to this great and historic problem In importance
comes the question of education. Can ultimate value be achieved
through education? Hocking thinks not. Yet I think he has scarcely
touched the real danger, perhaps the surest way to become unpopular
would be to vigorously attack the supposed merits of education. Yet
"Do one is quite fo uncertain as the educator himself as to what he
can achieve for the good of society. A good example of the muddled
thinking which is making the rounds in this field is to be found in
I*
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Mr. parsons' recent book, Crime and t h e Criminal . He points out
that the national budget for crime is three times that for education
and suggests that we reverse the^e figures. "It is probably safe t o
assert," he 3ays, "that the trebling of our budgets for scientific
education would reduce the cost of crime by t^o thirds." TFe must
preserve group solidarity at all costs or suffer still further dis-
integration of the social bonds. Yet a few generations ago when
the majority of our people possessed little of the knowledge now
common to all, the social solidarity, he ssys, was much gre ter than
at present. w Perhaps education and disintegration are compat-
riots. But how either is to bring about the much needed improve-
ment in the crime situation is not pointed out. Obviously the
proper "scientific" education has not yet been devised. Hocking is
right in pointing out that it is the Divine act and that alon.;
vhich give3 to education it3 worth.
,fTe now turn to a study of religion in its distinctive function
of worship and prayer. Here we should CDiie in clos-r contact with
the Divine activity.
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CHAPTER III
WORSHIP AND MYSTICISM
A. The worship process
"Worship, or prayer is the special sphere of the will
in religion. ... it Is more than an act of thought--it in-
tends to inst itute 3ome communication or transaction with
n
-od where*-"*!' will answers will. " 1
Worship then is the communion of the spirit with God. Our
thinking finds God as an object in the third person. The purpose
of worship is to break down this barrier and come into immediate
contact with rTod so that "he" may become "thou": a communion in the
second person.
1. The value of tecn'ique in worship
A
It is this inner element of worship, called reflection, which
is the important consideration. The continual danger of permitting
external phenomena to take the place of worship, Dr. Hocking thinks,
should be carefully pointed out. It might be well to cast aside all
forms, ceremonies, rites, assemblies, sacrifices, sacraments and ob-
servances at least long enough to see that they are not the truly
significant things in worship; yet Hocking recognizes their value.
The philosopher, trained in the use of concepts unknown to the pop-
ulace, might not miss such secondary aids to worship, though he
would be in danger of constructing some of his own. I believe it is
open to question whether one can reach high stages of worship with
no active physical and psychical agencies of preparation. Even the
quietistic types cannot be said to be wholly without these stimuli.
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Religion, umhampered, would make its own fresh selection, for there
has always been a distinct importance, "real or supposed", attached
to this active vocal side of worship. The value of a saint seems to
lie in the simple fact that he "knows how to communicate with Crod."
The peculiarities which he possesses apoear as his chief marks of
distinction. 2
2. Difficulty of the Mystic
Of all men the Mystic should be the best able to inform us
concerning the distinguishing characteristics of worship and the
ways in which it differs from the cognitive process. Though the
Mystic's knowledge of worship is the most complete conception we
have, yet he has to be interpreted, as he seems to be at loss to
explain his own process. it appears to defy rational explanation.
To the one who has not experienced something of these sacred things
the language of the mystic is well nigh meaningless.
*
Note on Transcendence
By delegating the Mystic as the ideal type of worshiper,
Professor Hocking Justly lays himself open to favoring the
theory of transcendence. I don't see how he can escape this
accusation. He appears to me to stand out in sharp distinct-
ion from the modern emphasis on immanence. As far as I am
able to understand him this thought of Divine transcendence is
carried in the background through his whole philosophy. It
appears below especially strong in his discussion of religious
creativity, the need of God, and the need of an absolute, and
more especially his principle of alternation. It is not, how-
ever, transcendence which cannot be touched, or which excludes
immanence. In fact the goal of Divine transcendence seems to
^ e Divine immanence, as seen in his discussion of the Divine
Aggress ion.
3. The negative path
In the preparation for worship there are certain important
Physical or overt accompaniments, the purpose of which is to direct
one's attention upon the Object of his worship. ""Such things as

fasting, prayer, various "bodily movements and attitudes, and the
seeking of solitude and simplicity are all contributing agencies.
This is largely a process of world-negation. Likewise the inner
preparation is primarily that of negation or purgation--a getting
rid of the lusts of the flesh! The ultimate end of this, Hocking
thinks, is not a denial of life but a transformation of interests,
for the logical end of self denial would be self-annihilation. ^
This is the good which the true Oriental mystic seeks, but is not
the highest in Christian mysticism. While those of the type of
Mise Underhill so emphasise the mystic "way" and explain its sub-
jective process as to leave out any vital account of an Other's
part in the process. ^
a. Meditation
In turning away from the world the mystic must have something
to turn toward. He directs himself toward his absolute good, by a
process of meditation or prayer. This, In part, takes the form of
self-reminding- that is, to make real to himself his own faith, to
remind himself of the good he seeks. This "voluntary recollection",
or meditation upon the deep principles of life, generally takes the
form of prayer, ^ften it Is but the repetition of a formula, as in
the striking case of the Mohammedan prayer. "There is one^Jod,
Allah is his name." But neither concrete object nor formula >S
sufficient a3 an object of meditation. This is merely preliminary.
Mystics of all ages have learned to cut this process short and bring
themselves face to face with the ^bject of their desire. This is
achieve! by an inward thrust which drives the soul on toward its
b
ob j ect ive
.
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b. Prayer
To Hocking prayer is virtually synonymous with worship. It is
the instrument "by which a^-brings himself into the presence of the
Object of hi3 worship. True prayer anticipates a Being to answer
it. ^or, "if we are offered a man-made god and a self-answering
prayer, we will rather have no god and no prayer. There can be no
valid worship except that in which man is bent by the presence of
the Most Real, beyond his will." ? It is fatal to play with prayer;
to pray as if there were a Sod, believing there is none.
The answer to prayer is a fresh insight into reality. Revela-
tion, inspiration, and the prophetic consciousness, are the fruits.
The answer to prayer, depending -joon the nature of the suppliant
, .is hot
to the egoist but to the simple and sincere. Closely associated
with this is the "negative oath", often mentioned in the writings of
the Mystics, together with the tfripu^ vow of poverty, chastity and
obedience
.
c. The final effort
Paradoxically, the final effort is a cessation of all effort,
an effortless waiting; a vo luntary, but not an idle passivity, is
induced and maintained by a most intense self-unification. Without
this final cessation of effort these processes • would turn in upon
themselves in hopeless and endless confusion. Thls
>
in brief^ is the
"ystlc's preparation. It ends in the expectation of a coming some-
thing- an answer from the Absolute. In the words of professor
Hocking this negative path is
"ati activity ending in a voluntary passivity destined to
give way in turn to an involuntar y passivity when God accepts
and lifts to himself the prepared soul. Its history is that
of an activity of self - suppress ion which must itself be sup-
pressed". 8
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B. The principle of alternation
The principle of alternation in Its cost common form is to be
observed in every-day living as a distinction between the parts and
the whole, of any task or object of pursuit. '>: e alternate atten%-
*-on between the several parts, and between the parts and the whole.
Now in viewing the universe we have no intention of going back to
the older dualisms of mind and body or God and world. Metaphysically
"God and the world belong together--neit her is anything without the
other". However, this gives us no "maxim for historical conduct".
In the course of history man can only pursue one at a time, ''an can
have but one objective at a time. Though God and the world are in-
separable they must be pursued in alternation. &
1. The dialectic of worshio
To recover the natural vitality and worthwhileness which life
demands for its existence one must return to the waole-idea and re-
cover that. This is the chief function of worship. And because we
love life and refuse the abstractions which are a denial of it, we
revert naturally by an inner compulsion, to the recovery provided
in worship. T,Then the end of worship has again been reached the
moral value once more becomes active. Hence In the life of the
mystic a continuous cycle is set up in which the love of God and
human ambition 3tand as opposite poles of attraction and repulsion.
Each one in turn becomes the life of the other. The two love3 or
goals are, in the final analysis, one "substance" involving
"alternatives in the history of the empirical will".
The assumption here is that as work cannot exist in and for it-
self neither can worship. For worship involves the cessation of
volitional activity, while the^orker is constantly losing his
vision.

"Thus, each.. 3pect of life apart from its alternate be-
comes a mechanism. And the whole of human existence falls
into two phases, work and worshio- the domain of duty and the
domain of love, respect ively. "
H
2. The sufficient sanction of worship
Worship, as we have seen it, is "but one phase of the mystic
life. Its ultimate value must "be judged by its effect: by that
which it anticipates. This test is twofold;: it must support and
find value in the world of parts, It must not only su3tain^but it
must creste values, d.t must not alone reproduce, it must originate,
it must create. It must answer the inner need of the psalmist when
he cried, "Create in me a clean heart, 0 God, and renew a right
spirit within me". He was seeking a 3oul creativity. This, and
this alonejis a sufficient justification for worship. It is our
purpose to examine ?this creativity more carefully.
C. Fruits of religious worship
Revelation, inspiration, and pro : het ic consciousness though
not used in the exact sense in which they once « are,are still in
some form or otner the results of religion as they appear in the
individual life. In the history of the corporate life they have
yet another meaning as they weave themselves into the life of
society and the -tate. ^
1. Revelat ion--,fhe certainty of religion
Revelation records itself in the form of ancient books or
history, and in contemporary experience. The one should be in-
terpreted by the other in any view of revelation. ^
r
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a. Truths, old and new
There are two dominant notes In the voice of the Mystic,
originality and certainty. There is a seeming paradox In his
originality^ for it is nothing new to know what he knows, namely
God. But life is new and original; the self is its own greatest
enigma. To discover Itself and the truth about itself is the
most original, the freshest t ruth in the world. The truth about
life and about the self is life itself. Tod is constant; the self
is new, original, enigmatic. In discovering the one we reveal the
meaning of the other. Old truths are repeated and rediscovered as
often as life is repeated and unfolded. And the greatest certainty
which we possess is the certainty of tne self. And the certainty
t hat God is, is more important than what He is. ^
b. The making of judgments
As the strength of the Mystic lies in this note of certainty
he needs to be careful not to be certain of too much. Ke may be
absolutely certain of the Absolute, and of himself, but^?how much
more? Eut here a second danger arises, for certainty tends to turn
in upon itself in endless abstraction^ These must be avoided for
it is life which he seeks. New impressions of the world arise as
the result of worshlp^and the empirical task of realizing them in
experience presents itself. Here lie great dangers, for the new,
untried, abstract judgments must be given life and content to test
their validity. This fringe of raw judgment and empirical exper-
ience is the battle ground--the growing edge of truth and life.
2. Inspiration-—*tie creativity of religion
We must reject the old idea that inspiration is pure and un-
explainable miracle and seek to know as much of its method and

logic as possible. Though its logic is not of the nature of rigid
predet erminism^yet it is far removed from pure chance and irre-
sponsibility. *^
a. Possibility of creativity
Ideas tend to reproduce themselves in endless self atrophy-
ing monotony. In so far as we are dull ure can only dully try to
overcome our dullness, and "only he who is already wise can gain
wisdom". However under certain observable conditions when one is
willing to become intensely conscious of the full implication of
an untruth he gains a positive outside touch which is sufficient
to disorganize his existing order. A subtle and growing feeling
becomes a sudden bursting conviction generally of the negative type;
that Is, against things as they are. T*e see the horrible error of
it all. The tradition concerning Lincoln seeing the horrors of the
slave trade and his subsequent profound conviction is an example in
point. Tolstoi was primarily a man of this type. This subtle pro-
cess comes a^out by meditation, by learning to feel or sense the
untruth of the world round about, by s breaking away from the de-
celts of a stagnant, dead world. Hocking says it "depends upon the
power to find your Absolute". It is the power to see our error in
the pure light of truth. It is through the power of religion that
novelty-- "syst em-destroy lng novelty"--is created. "Invention is,
in its essence," he says, "no rare event: every soul of man that
lives and works in the world is creating at every moment of his
life some infinitesimal rill of novelty. " 18
b. Nature of creativity
The event of creativity is not something independent of the
existing order: it is rather a climax resulting from the total
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implication of all that is past both good and evil. The word which
Hocking fastens upon as the key to this is ref l exion . "The old idea
has penetrated to the self: the self has been stung by it; and in
the reflexion thereby occasioned the new thing is engendered. "
This result of reflexion in which the mind arrives at a solution is
called induct ion .
The process involves the principle of alternation. For "induct-
ion is external reflexion- and reflexion is internal induction".
Creativity is not so much the result of a direct effort as it is the
by-product of fearlessly and truthfully viewing the Whole and the
parts. Reflexion is the generalized form which worship takes in our
experience; thus Hocking advises that the best way to be creative is
to have personal knowledge of the Absolute. For such guidance of
/fnrOd "men may legitimately pray, and expect an answer."
c. The fact, of creativity
The Important consideration is not how much or how little of
the new may be found in the old, but whether or not there is any-
thing new. The bare fact of creativity is the object of our
search. The false in the past has been uncovered and corrected.
The new, similar to the'old yet dissimilar^ rises in the place of the
old. This is the supreme fact of Religion-- it s supreme contribution
to history. Creativity to Hocking seems to be the act of knowing,
which is the secret of life. It is a discovery of new possibilities
of life. He admits that creativity is the essential quality of the
will, but continually refers us to a previous knower in the universe.
Our lives are but an "apprenticeship in creativity". He is more or
less Kantian in his theory of creativity. Eut however much he may
stand in the shadow of an Absolute, he believes nman to be creative.
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Our creativity is a discovery of reality, a discovery which carries
with it its own self- verify ing certainty. Religion is not creating
anything for men, but creating men, conferring on them power and
20freedom to create. n
If we understand Professor Hocking correctly, all minds are
creative and religiD.i ie the essential form or the most character-
istic form of creativity. Should he then conclude that all minds
and all creativites are essentially religious? it seems to me this
would be a dangerous broadening of religion. Not a few writers as
for example Edward ~*cribner Aimes.have taken the broad view that all
experience of progress or growth is religious experience whether it
be the creation of a new plant by a Burbank or the founding of a
new religion, or the saving of an emolre. There is danger in this
view whi£h I do not see h ow Hocking can fully escape.
3. Prophecy— the flower of religion
The final fruit of religion then is man- man at his best. The
distinguishing feature of this man, we are told, is his prophetic
consciousness. Here we see man both experiencing, and partaking of
the highest values. He achieves value and he shares value, he is a
being of infinite worth in a cosmos of infinite worth. Let us
analy^*-- Hocking's idea of the nature of this "prophetic conscious-
ness". 21
a. stoicism and altruism plus
we are shown by Hocking in his chapter on the "Prophetic Con-
sciousness" that neither stoicism nor altruism is sufficient to gain
the desired vantage point. stoicism derives its happiness in denying
the value of ends. it sees that unhappiness is caused by inner con-
flict, not by the nature of the outer evil encountered. In fact it

does not depend upon external things at all but upon our Inner
method of dealing with them. Happiness tends to be destroyed by
failure unless in playing the game I am able to "combine an un-
limited attachment with an unlimited detachment". The good sports-
man has something of this spirit. We may hope to win^but
. some one
has to fail. The theory of the stoic is to play the game as if the
CO
treasure were there, knowing it is not."
The altruist believes that even though he may fail some one
will win. There must be success but it need not be mine. I may
fall, I may lose all, even to my life, but the good will succeed.
These are great and noble virtues^but they ignore the Individual,
^e are looking for man as an end, not as a means merely. J
True hapolness is only achieved when both man and his object
oarticioate in value. This requires what both stoicism and
altruism deny,--ra power over facts in the midst of finite circum-
stances.^ In whatever sense God is to triumph in history I must
triumph also, "uch an assurance is necessary for happiness. To
possess such an assurance is to oossess what Hocking calls the
Ok
prophetic consciousness. n
To persuade ourselves that this is impossible, he thinks, is
the modern form of devil worship. Men do actually possess this con-
sciousness; it is what gives them courage to die for their convict-
ions. It is the presupposition of authority: it is the power of a
faith, the foundation of action, the Joy of service, the zest of
devotion, and the heart of happiness. It gives to all history its
3tamp of permanence, its note of reality, and its sense of direct-
ion. An,d it gives to man his proper setting in the course of
history. it causes him to act as though eternity were his share,
knowing that i»t i.S>. 25
e
b. Possibility of the prophetic consciousness
This consciousness is possible through the united and sim-
ultaneous action of man and God working for the same end. The only
certainty which the mystic acquires is the certainty of victory over
the world. The mystic tends to deny history, hut the back-sweep
from hi3 experience of God. becomes a re-affirmation of history.
This prophetic consciousness is not only possiblejit is ob-
ligatory. To reject ones call to prophecy is to lose ones soul,
for "immortality", Hocking thinks, "may be the chief and total ob-
ject of the prophetic consciousness". 26
Nummary
In the present chapter we have endeavored to 3tudy Hocking's
interpretation of the deepest element of religion, namely, worship.
Here his dialectic of experience which has been developing in the
preceding chapters comes to the point of its great amplification
in the "principle of alternation". It is an experience which
carries man in persistent alternation between r-od and the world:
between the Whole and its parts. 'r'e are not yet done with this
dialectic. There are its results to be farther examined in the
succeeding chapter and its theory to be examined in Chapter V, but
it is Just here that we catch its greatest swing.
What is the result of this dialectic? Han! Man in the pro-
cess of transformation? of remaking? Something likejthat , I am
sure. And this man we are led to believe is a product of what is
commonly known as worship. It is worship which produces him. Wor-
ship is not one of the many needs of man. It is rather the one
thing without which man himself would be impossible. Does this
mean that perhaps the man who is not a product of worship is less
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than a man? Even that he is not man? Hardly that) and yet it may
mean at least a golng-in-the-wrong-direct ion. Whether or not the
end, if we presume to apooint ends, which one attains in going the
wrong way is essentially different from the end he attains in going
the creative way where men are made, we know not. Of this he has
nothing to say.
But perhaps our idealist, as Hocking undoubtedly is, is asking
too much, perhaps it is appointed unto man to be of the earth,
earthy, who can reach such an Utopia as the prophetic conscious-
ness demands? What religion offers more than a doubtful hope for
such attainment? If there be such a religion. how does it attain
its ends?
Others have wrestled with this problem and have come to con-
clusions, satisfactory to themselves. Pierce thinks that to
posit an absolute or a ^-od destroys all creativity. He wishes to
think that we come from the mists of star dust, according to the
inexorable law of nature. And that according to the same law man is
slowly pushing out into regions of uncatalogued possibilities, we
build oar bridge as we proceed working from the known into the
unknown. "We construct reality as we advance. ^7 now we turn
to discover what claims Hocking will make for the possibilities of
religion.
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CHAPTER IV
THEP0S3IBILITIE3 OF RELIGION
A. The human element
Man has never been without ideals: he is the one animal who
has always, with purpose and conscious direction, entered into his
own remaking. The question is, how is the remaking process to "be
effected? Not only religion, but social and political science as
well, has come to realize^ each in its turn, that there is a "human
material to be reckoned with, having properties akin to inertia,"
and each has found its own ideals of life and freedom particularly
difficult to maintain. Political science at last, in despair over
the seeming impossibility of adequately remaking, society, has
abandoned its faith in dlscipllne^ss being inadequate. The only
possibility for man^it says^ is a change at the source. But relig-
ion
;
while constantly speaking ill of original human motive, has
never despaired of its possibilities. *
1. That change is desirable
Conceptually, we do not know what we wish man to be. We want
him to be ideal. But if what we thought to be an ideal proves un-
attainable it ceases to be an ideal. We have done much groping in
the search for Ideals. Do they lie in the direction of discipline
or in the way of following natural impulses? Professor Hocking has
but little time for tne modern disciples of liberal religion whose
hell has "burned out": whose God, remade in the image of the
expansive spirit. is such a Jovial fellow that he could not "denounce
f
anything": and whoee "native goodness of man" needs but to be de-
veloped. The way of liberalism seems to lead to disintegration,
not to the ideal. And each philosophy of liberalism ends in a re-
construction upon some sort of discipline. "^od is dead", cries
Nietzsche, "alles 1st erlaubt , --everyt hlng is permitted!" But
soon after he tells us that "relentless self-mastery" is the way
of happiness, f
To know what man should be is also to perceive in a degree the
hindrances to that achievement. "To say that mankind is by nature
bad is, in its origins, only a more sophisticated way of saying
that virtue is difficult." 3 And the way to achieve the Ideal is
by some type of discipline. But discipline must not nor cannot
destroy our primitive passions; neither is it safe to veneer them
with an artificial civilization. We have also learned the fatal-
ity of attempting to satisfy individual desires. It is the whole
man that must gain satisfaction.
Thus Hocking wants us to feel that though we do not know exact-
ly what we wish man to be, we do know, we have discovered by exper-
ience, the direction which he should take. In the light of his
statement concerning nTod,-to wit: w e know that G-od is, but we do
not know what he is,—this attitude seems logical.
a. Inadequacy of society as an agent
"Society has been inadequate as an instrument of remaking;
hence it is not competent to save him or to map out his course for
him. There are two reasons for this. The first we have pointed
out before; namely^ its lack of a sense of reality and Independence,
'"here reality is ascribed to it, it still seems to fail to provide
scope, or Tnug^t ¥e better say adequate impulse, for the remaking of
f
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human nature. Man's objective must be both adequate and attainable,
a requirement which society is incapable of meeting.
Christianity is distinctly anti-social in tone. It is avowed-
ly pessimistic as to what society can do for man in his present
state. it has been pointed out that the whole attitude toward
society was changed from one of optimism to one of distinct., oes-
cimism by the advent of Christianity into the Western world.
Mysticism is a denial of the world. Today Christianity re-affirms
society with more confidence than it ever has had before, as
Professor Hocking will no doubt agree. Yet the great character-
istic of Christianity i3 that it seeks for a power whose source is
4beyond society.
b. The Inadequacy of the finite God
In his article "Is the Group Cpirlt Equivalent to Cod for all
Practical Purposes?" Hocking points out three things which the
social god cannot supply. There is the need of peace, found only
in a fundamental unity: the need of freedom and aspiration of the
will: and the need of individual response and attention.
"If there be in the universe an object upc.i which there
can be reliance without criticism, a valid object of worship,
and a source of peace, that object must be other than the
soc ial Cod. " 5
While admitting certain values to be gained from the idea of
polytheism, Hocking feels that the only value any finite god may
have ieoends entirely upon his being an aspect of the Cod who is
not finite. This idea of the finite god and the social god are
all aspects of polytheism. As long as man is worshiping many gods
he is not worshiping the true Cod. They are products, he declares,
merely of ones own imagination, no matter how wonderful they may bej
and the worship of them but serves to keep man from the true Cod.
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c. The naturalising tendency
We have already mentioned the naturalizing tendency of re-
ligion. " In one sense we should be tolerant toward it, as this is
the inevitable result of thinking about religion; and think about
religion we must. We have also seen that ideas tend to become
dry, lifeless, and habitual, and to gradually lose their 3ense of
direction. But religion carries its own corrective with it; it is
the very heart and function of religion to secure freedom by break-
ing through determinisms of habit, mood and thought. Worship is
not satisfied with mere psychological process, it demands a meta-
physical reality--a God worthy of worship. °
d. Trie Absolute as goal
Eut however useful religion may be, it is not an end in itself.
The extravagent assertion of some modes of worship that union with
God is the desired goal is a self-destroying claim. I cannot de-
nounce the goods of this world and still live as a parasite upon
the labor of others. It would be preposterous to expect all human-
ity to do so, for we "have need of all these (other) things".
Whatever religion is it mu3t take up within itself and con-
serve all the true goods of the world. This, Hocking thinks, is
exactly whst t rue religion accomplishes. The true religion can
never come in the guise of a social code; -t\ot c$-r\ W come as a
denial of the worldj it cannot come with a pure other- worldliness
.
These alone then cannot be ultimate goods. They are rather dan-
gers to be avoided, not ends to attain. Mo. The ultimate possib-
ilities, if possibilities it has, must be searched for elsewhere.
qLet us look again within the individual. 7

2. A world of rebirth
'"hat then may this eternal religious activity accomplish for
the individual; if not for all individuals, then perhaps for 3ome,
even for one individual? Te would like to know if religion can
make a saint. That are its possibilities? it accomplishes or at
least it promises, a ™orld of rebirth. This rebirth we have common-
ly called conversion. That it is can best be decided after we dis-
cover what it does. Religion commonly presupposes the individual's
power of self-conscious reflection on human destiny". Might we say,
then, that conversion comes when one grasps the world in its com-
plete setting? It is a working out. of ones narmonious relation
to destiny. Christianity is the religion of rebirth, par excel-
^ence. That doe3 Christianity have to say? 10
B. That Christianity requires
In a word we can 3ay what Christianity requires. It requires
a complete transformation of the individual, on the basis of love.
It is more than a change of front, it is a change of self. Must I
love my neighbor? But I hate him! No pretense here will suffice.
That I that hates must become an I that loves. Is this possible?
Only, thinks Hocking, through extreme simplification; "except ye
become as little children". ^ Before asking any questions let us see
how Hocking applies this principle to some of the major instincts
of life.
1. The transformation of pugnacity
Pugnacity is the instinctive agent of readjustment. Experi-
ence modifies to a certain extent the natural level of pugnacity
by means of the natural educational agencies such as rivalry,
contest, criticism, and achievement. Christianity^- does not call
f
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for an eradication of pugnacity. It rather intends to transform
the instinct into a genuinely creative impulse. This, Hocking
thinks^ is its final transformation. To forgive your enemy creates
in him a new idea in which he may discover a "better way of life.
But to abolish antagonism from the world would result in an in-
discriminate treatment of good and evil. It is not this which we
want; rather, the establishment of a fundamental agreement which
permits an activity of the nature of contest and criticism within
certain limits. This is the office of Christianity. 12
Christianity undoubtedly has a preference toward virginity , but
obviously this is not its full meaning. It merely admits the non-
necessity of marriage for the complete satisfaction of the will.
But more important than that; it teaches that love is capable of
complete sublimation. Love in its purer form approaches religion
and is taken up within it. ~ex finds its true meaning within re-
ligion. The question which Christianity asks is concerning one's
attitude toward sex- it asks how one "looketh upon a woman". One
should view his neighbor as an immortal soul of infinite worth,
and treat him as such, as T'ant has so succinctly reminded us.
Christianity has its absolutes, but they are always such as are in
conjunction with the relative, not in place of it. And the absoi-
lute has no meaning for us without the relative. ^
Likewise Christianity prop03es to transform ambition so that
its goal becomes the "conferring of spiritual life". It is not the
desires for the felicities of heaven- there are dangers here. It
is rather the passion for soul3. This does not exclude the
2. The transformation of sex-love
The transformation of ambition
r
absolut e but , as with the transformed sex-love, it provides for the
relative, for the field of endeavor. This passion for souls,
Hocking thinks, is the highest form of interpretation yet found
for the 'will to po^er' . Thus in calling for the transformation of
1 A
the instincts Christianity achieves the saving of the individual.
C . The dilemma of Christianity
Previously we have agreed with Professor Hocking that an ideal,
to be such must be attainable. It must be practicable. Is this
goal of Christianity such an ideal? it would not appear to be. At
least these ideals as such have always been termed impossible, and
presumotuous. The folly of holding to an ideal, rn w>)ic/) a person
must both save- himself and save others^ was considered sufficient
proof of the hyfcoerl&y of Christ. It was this same fact of tne
self-incl'uslveness of Christianity which brought it into opposit-
ion with the Roman ctate: a "tate generally quite indifferent to
all religious cults. And not only history, but our own exoerlence
shows us that this ideal is quite out of reach. ^ Nay, the very
att^-mot is sheer folly, and I scarcely think Professor Hocking
has pointed out the full folly of it. we must seek light from the
Founder of Christianity. What did he mean when he said, "He
that saveth his life must lose it?" Here is a paradox indeed.
What must he lose? Life? If not life, then something akin to it?
Here, I am Inclined to think, comes the real force of that idea of
denial of society. Something in man must die. ^hat is it? A
false perspective perhaps? Error? ~ln? ~elf and the world?
And he is born to truth) which is inseparable from eternity.
Perhaps this 13 something of what Christianity sees.

1. Theory of "participation"
The eseence of Christianity is neither morality nor ethics;
it is the answer t o the question) How can the demands of these
codes be met? These can be met, and the dilemma of Christianity
be resolved, Hocking thinks^ through a participation of the self
in its Object. The result of such a participation is to give man
a vision of himself in his proper relation to the universe. True
humility is one of the earliest and surest evidences of the attain
ment of this relationship. Humility itself is not a virtue, merel
the necessary condition of virtue in man. Eut paradoxically the
humble Christian may act with the finality of the gods without the
slightest fear of that presumption of which Christianity has been
so frequently accused. This can be done only in conjunction with
the spirit of humility which says "Yet not I but . . . . worketh in me.
Here Hocking feels he has finally discovered the perfect pictur-
ing of the "will to power" with everything offensive removed. I
16
am inclined to agree.
A second advantage which he suggests is the "present attain-
ment in a single experience of those objects which in the course
of nature are reached only at the end of infinite progression".
This sounds as though the end of oar quest had been reached at
last. We are about to rejoice when the professor confronts us
with his eternal dilemma which springs up with mechanical dare I
say too m echanical ^» prec ision at every turn. To participate in
the nature of God it is first necessary to see God. But it is
only those who are pure in heart that can see Cod. L ' perhaps
"Aeons", the universal solvent of the evolutionist, or Plato's
dialectic ladder with r-od at the top_, should be called in to re-
solve the embarrassment. Eut these also even with time in their
o
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favor have trouble in reaching the end of the journey. Once more
we move the previous question: "How can a man know God? M
2. The Divine aggression
"The idea of salvation from the outside", Hocking says, "is
offensive to our sentiment of moral independence," only as we con-
sider the way, not the stat e of being
. The world's two great re-
ligions of self-help, Erahmanlsm and Buddhism,, have in the end taken
on a dependence upon supernatural assistance which they did not
possess in the beginning. But Christianity alone is the religion
built uDon thi3 idea of salvation from without. Purely this is not
psychologically unsupported, for all life points to some source of
origination and main-t€-na;nce outside of Itself. Life is not a
closed impenetrable monad.
But neither is God an unmoving Absolute. He is better known
as a God of love. And love is not an abstraction, it is a force
plying between beings. It is God, literally and Individually con-
cerned about men: suffering with them and for them. It is a God
becoming indifferent to his o T*n ego in his Intense love for in-
dividual men. A God who breaks through his absolute that he Tnaj!
come to the assistance of man. This is the Divine aggression; . It
is salvation from above. It Is complete satisfaction of the de-
mands of Christianity and tne needs of human nature.
3. The last step
At last we have come to the end of our empirical investigation.
Te have also come to the end of the dialectic of experience. It is
exhausted, worn out by its long and arduous Journey, ^e have also
come in a sense to the end of knowledge of philosophy, religion,
metaphysics: to the end of everything, it seems, but dilemma. For
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the quest ion--Can a man know God? --may still be asked. Perhaps
even a dignified professor, out of sheer desperation would be
t emoted to answer in the language of Ripley, that you cani
"Believe it or not !
"
In other words, religion does nothing to relieve the need of
faith. We know that to believe in such a God and such a salvation
would give life its adequate meaning and history a sense of per-
manence and reality which it seems to demand. But acceptance comes
by faith and faith alone. Faith, Hocking thinks, is not a part of
philosophies or of philosophizing ; so at this point he, being a
philosopher, comes to an end, --a hesitating and uncertain end.
I am tempted to complain at this. Has he, then, so recently made
the acquaintance of faith? Must he exhaust reason to arrive at
faith? It would seem rather that faith has been his constant com-
panion. ~hy speak of dialectics and dilemmas and theories at all
if faith is not the foundation stone as well as the cap stone? If
philosophy has faith to say so much it should have faith to speak
with some degree of certainty concerning the end toward which it
ha3 been traveling: a certainty, as Hocking himself would say.
' that'
f
God is" arid that he is a "rewarder of thcw that dili^t-ntly
seek him".
D. Religion of the future
Finally we should like to show what Hocking thinks will be-
come of religion. He finds himself able to conceive of the total
dlsapoearance of religion. Eut this in fact will never happen.
Each decline of religion only seems to foretell a new outburst in
which neT life and truth are recovered. Ther^ ge&njs a 'v^ys -° "be
some soul who is ready to assume responsibility for the sin and
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shame of a wayward people and win them back to righteousness.
The religion of the future will not be creedless. it will not
be merely a religion of humanity, nor will it be identical with
metaphysics. It will be a religion quite similar to^ religion of
today. It will have C-od as its central theme with the question of
evil as its toughest problem. Its main quest will be perception
or experience of Cod. It will be positive and dynamic but not
essentially new; ever new in its task of creating men, new men)
but old in its task of interpreting Cod, the same God.
Speculation has not been a major part of the interpretation
thus far. The final chapter to which we now turn will be an
attempt to follow Hocking into the more difficult field of theory
end speculation.
(I
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CHAPTER V
PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY
A. Problems of metaphysical reality
1. Introduction
It is by the hypothetical method that Professor Hocking intro-
duces us to three of the fundamental problems of Metaphysics. As I
see it, this method has two distinct advantages: (1) It is well
adapted to a broad freedom of treatment and avoids much of the
monotony of tiresome details. (2) It anticipates and answers cer-
tain inevitable questions which arise in connection with the sub-
sequent epist emological inquiry. Metaphysics asks^Mfoat is real?
^hat is eternal? What is the nature of the backlylng ground of
existence? If there be lod what is his nature?
There are three things we must expect of any God who is of
permanent worth to us: (1) He must unify our world. (2) He must
furnish an absolute standard. (3) He must be an intimate person-
al peing, a "-od of value. 1
2. The need of unity
The problem of a fundamental unity, Professor Hocking contends,
is quite synonymous with th<= problem of optimism. The pluralist
fears that he will lose both his freedom and his moral3 in a mon-
istic universe. Put the pluralist hlmaelf will admit that no
optimism is possible without some kind of unity: some character,
Borne semblance of stability. There can be no optimism in complete
disorganization, prom this it is only a brief argument to prove
Du
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that there can be no true optimism until there is a complete unity
of some nature. Eut we are in a world of Becoming. We have ob-
jectives to attain. We are subject to error. We behold conflict.
The Real must be attained, it is out beyond. Sot
h
our optimism
and freedom rest in the unity of ends ; this is what makes them
possible. Optimism demands this much: but it demands more. It
demands "that the Real is the goo 3, and not the evil". This pro-
blem of e vil thus becomes the critical problem of such a monism.
The scientific attitude which through the law of cause and
effect would meet every evil by the full law of justice seems to
fall here. There is something to be gained by ignoring evil, by
refusing to consider it, dealing rather with the good. This is not
to be understood as a sanct iori^o f moral laxity or a saving of per-
sonal effort. For the process is not a mechanical one. To permit
evil, with the assurance that forgiveness is in the offing merely
augurs destruction, it is disi troMS. ihe point here is easily
misconstrued: I accomplish nothing through either ignorance or in-
difference. But by ignoring a known evil, refusing to acknowledge
it, and turning to something good, I not only forget, but genuinely
dispose of it. Optimism demands of monism that it 3 Reality is the
good, and when left to Itself would make for righteousness only.
Thus Hocking's monistic world leaves room for a degree of
pluralism. It is a monism which provides for the elimination of
evil; at the same time it "Is such only as to give meaning to its
pluralism; our belonging to God such only as to give us greater
hold upon ourselves". a
3. The need of an Absolute
The critical pass in the problem of the Absolute is to discover

how an Absolute may become useful to us "for deductive purposes".
The failure to find such an /Absolute gives rise to many examples
of the fallacy of the universal. The most common of these fall-
acies are produced by a "reflexive turn" which ignores objective
reality. To assert, as Descartes did, self certainty or conscious
experience, is to assert that and nothing more. Without accepting
some objective reality there remains only this subjective absolute
which is a "coefficient of all experience", a "determinant of none".
There is no solution for the problem of reality here, for if I can
be sure of myself but^nothing more, I become doubtful of self as
Hume did.
We may seek for an absolute in the realm of morality as Kant
dld^but when we emerge into the world of experience we feel that
we have severed all relations with our absolute, and morality can
not be its own justifler. professor Hocking seems to Ignore that
it is just this which points out the failure in Josjah Poyce's
philosophy of Loyalty. Te cannot slmoly be loyal for Royalty'
s
sake; at least., not without ambiguity of terras. Another fallacy,
perhaps the oldest of this type, is hedonism. Happiness cannot
be had for Its own sake.
All these irrelevant unlversals, professor Hocking thinks,
are essentially retrospective. They can tell us what has been but
can set no store by the future, and in so far as they are solely
retrosoect ive they are self defeating. But he also finds that the
inner secret which, though seldom seen, is the most obvious, is not
retrospect but prospect . Idea goes forth and lays hold upon value
and objectivity, giving meaning to the self. ^ re accept this as we
acceDt life with neither "rhyme nor reason"- it is hard to locate
because of Its very simplicity. It is this acceptance which enables
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us to interpret experience in terms of value. Tith^t/C the
Absolute there would "be no problem of eVilj all would be merely
colorless experience.
^n the religious side this connotes "absolute justice") per-
fection of ^-od,—a very fruitful concept and far from being useless
for deductive purposes. "On the contrary, it is the only radically
creative attitude yet known to humanity." * if the idea of
value can have any connotation for us, Hocking, the idealist,
speculates that there may be something in the mere fact of Divine
attention to objects which confers value upon them, and if that
divine attention be of the nature of love then love of this sort
may be the one thing in the world that is creative.
""hatever else Tod is he must at least be Absolute. Here
Hocking gladly becomes a pragmat ist , - -long enough to demolish their
argument, for the one pragmatic test of truth is absolute; that is,
non-pragmatic: and pragmatism ends in consuming Itself.
True, an Absolute cannot be of the 'block universe' concept—
fion. Neither can it be a Hegelian absolute which destroys freedom
and puts us in a deterministic universe, where evil is on a level
with crood and life loses its significance.
~uch absolutes will not satisfy: what we seek is in the nature
of a Changeless Ultimate in our world of change. It is as essential
that we move toward something as that we move at all. In. "the world
of diversity we must find some identity. ~uch must be our Absolute,
"uppose we take a view of life in which the self is the minor pre-
mise: the Absolute, the Major? Then every circumstance, no matter
how trivial, has a meaning. "G-iven the ^elf and the Changeless is
it some how conce ivab le ;' Hocking asks, "that all the rest should
spin Itself out between?"
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4. The yftroblem of personality
In Chapter XV of The leaning of God in Human Experience , we
find what amounts to professor Hocking's position toward the Per-
sonalistic school. Admittedly he must "be classed g£ personal istA? but
we se« him at times expressing a vague tut insistent unwillingness
to go the full length with them. He speaks elsewhere of the
"poverty" of his thought of personality* and says that the word
"person" has for him a "harsh and rigid sound".
"It is God in external relation to me as my Other, that
seems the personal God- it is the n-od as the Whole, including
me within himself, that seems impersonal: and the true God is
the Whole, as in Christian doctrine God is the One of the three
persons." And again "we know that whatever selfhood we have is
an involution of the self-hood of the ^hole, and that our ex-
ternal relations to our fellows do but follow and reproduce in
their own more distant fashion the relation of ^-od to us which
from his view is internal." 5
Complete personalization of God would, in the mind of professor
Hocking, making of him a finite God. He is in perfect harmony
with "YcTaggart's contention that the finite God is of no worth".
He concludes in these words:
"The personality o^ ~-od must be, we think, personality
whose bonds are broken in 'passing through infinity': denying
thi3 infinite (we) must reject the rest as comparatively
useless God become an intruder." However, it is to be
admitted that "the balance between the denial of n-o& and the
right perception of God is most delic&te, and difficult to
maintain. " 6
Having stated briefly his negative view let us see how much
value the idea of personality has for Professor Hocking. We are
persuaded that he gives it a very lofty and important place in his
system. In fact Professor W. A. Brown of Union is satisfied that
he makes personality the most real thing in the world. * if he
"could not live without the Absolute" neither could he live without
a personal God.
Love and the moral quality are the "most humanly valuable

58
,
attributes of the divine nature". But if God is personal and
righteous what shall we say about the problem of evil? Where shall
we place responsibility? The argument against n od in the light of
a world of evil and suffering, stands, as McTaggart has presented
it, as follows: God--lf he exists— has either permitted this, in
which case he is not a god of goodness- or else it exists in spite
of him^ in which case he is not Absolute. In either case he is of
little value to us. If good is to win out it can do so as well
without him as with him. And if ,then, good is in the process of
winning out, immortality need not be a part of faith in ^-od.
This logic seems impregnable; if it; isffchen the only god we
could have would be a hypothetical god,—what ever for the moment
we wish him to be,-or in reality, no god at all. But man does
seem to meet God, in the realm of experience and he must be a
known n-od--metaphy slcally real. Professor Hocking is in full
accord with this objection. But he holds that the basic fact about
all exoerience is that it is metaphysically real. If this be true
then ^-od must be real. Here we may vlev two of our teacher-Ls
gre-t doctrines. First is the central place which he accords to
exoerience, and secondly his idealistic conception of Nature. Eoth
of these will be more fully developed before our theoretical argu-
ment is concluded. In regard to the value of knowledge he states
elsewhere that about the best knowledge can hope to do is to
classify, to relate, to state the laws for things: that it can
hardly hope to find an snwer to their inner meaning and purpose;
thus, experience is the more fundamental of the two.
~hatever of personal or moral worth Peality may possess must
be derived from this immediate direct inference found in experience
rather than from abstract theory. How are we to arrive at an
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understanding of this position? Eut one inference need "be made
further. Men, as history shows, have never lived as though pain
were the last word in pain. They have some way risen to the
optimistic view out of the midst of suffering. They never seem to
try consistently to escape it. Hardship seems even to lend a zest
to life which ease denies. The answer to our question lies hidden
in this secret. Is it not that there is something ultimate and
external to myself--external to the competitive field of human
associations, "whose relation to me is not subject to evil through
its own defect"? Is it not my relation to this Other which gives
me victory in defeat? Here, we think, is the very heart of exper-
ience. G-od becomes a necessity without which life itself would he
unbearable. We live as though there w0fe such a Reality. * Thus
Hocking concludes a great hypothetical plea for a metaphysical
reality.
I have collectei other facts of importance in relation to
Professor Hocking's system of metaphysics to be found outside of his
formal argument and place them here before passing on to the problem
of epist emology . It is here that we wish to see him more especially
in his relation3hio to the per sonalist lc school.
5. Hocking vs. Knudson
Professor ^nudson discusses six fundamental problems in the
field of metaphysics. xu Of these six we havo^Hocking agrees in
ascribing to reality a fundamental unity which leaves room for a
"degree of plurality. ~econd
;
he agrees to an essential personality
in ultimate Reality but at the same time he swings strongly toward
absolute Idealism. "Thile admitting that we need an Absolute which
will be useful for "deductive purposes" he feels "that the God who

60
merely is, as our Absolute Other, Is by that fact both promotive
of our weal and of our morality". We need the presence of an Other
Mind which stands "outside the arena of human effort with its con-
trasts of good and evil". 11 In his most recent book on Types
of Philosophy , he defends his position thus: "There is a prin-
ciple of chs ng elessness in the basi3 of things on which certainty
can take hold and remain certain." 12 It is in viewing man's re-
lationship to ^-od and to his fellow man that we come full force
upon the problem of morality. 'nhile in God's attitude toward man
there is something of absoluteness which is not moral but a-moral,
Tod as Essence could we 3ay? This and only this is what selves force
and authority to Tod's relationship to man. We have seen that this
is only one side of the relationship, or that of a contrast which
exists between man and nod. The story of Christianity is the 3tory
of the "Divine Aggression" which makes possible the transformation
of the individual. This is the other side.
Does Hocking believe that personality is then but a stage in
the development of the soul? Perhaps, but not a passing stage,
rather an eternal stage. Personality loses itself as it approaches
the Whole, but gains it again when it recedes. And alternation is
the deepest principle of life. The soul gains definiteness only as
it approaches the concrete, and vision as it approaches its other.
And the other jSome way^ is both. Here, I think, it is tut a step to
futile speculation and an agnostic turn of mind; or if speculation
be not futile, at least the speculative mind seems never able to
come to rest
.
In answer to Knudson's question, is reality to be conceived of
as concrete and individual or as super-empirical and super- individ-
ual^ Hocking would say that, he wqa not prepared to remove all the
"super" from the Absolute.
»
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Another question of metaphysics raised by personalists has to
do with the nature of reality; is it active or passive? And again
in Hocking's Absolute we should be forced to find something which
resembled that passive rest toward which all struggle seems to bend
its effort Being
>
which is at once both the end and the inclusion
of all becoming. However, this is not in disagreement with person-
alism^for such a passive element is not given in direct experience
but is an implication of all experience. Our experience exper-
ience of God. This thought is developed later.
B . The problem of epistemology
Practically the whole of the preceding argument has led to
the conclusion that "God is to be known in experience if at all.
The question ""hich now confronts us is whether the reality en-
countered in experience is in any "literal sense living and divine,
and directly knowable as such". *3
1. Man's sense of dependence
interrogating experience we are led to the conclusion that
the fundamental and original element to be found there is man's
sense qf ieoendence. The earliest religious promptings of man
indicate this fact. All the crises of life point to it. Man's
earliest experiences with "nature-powers" bring him Inescapably
to the acknowledgment of it. Indeed we may conclude that social
experience becomes religious experience only as it becomes an ex-
perience of "TTature cower". This reminds us of the great
^chleierrnacher and his centralizing thought of the feeling of
"absolute dependence" as the central fact of man's empirical self.
The handmaiden of this sense of dependence or limitation is
0
ignorance. But though man may acknowledge his ignorance of the
world, he has the feeling that it i^s known. We may call this our
original experience of the presence of God. Not simply the feel-
ing "it is known", hut, "He knows" is the final resting place of
our faith. From my ignorance, which is not static but subject to
diminution, I must assume the universe to be knowable; from my
knowledge, T"hich is ever incomplete^ realize that there is a
Fnower. It is only this fact^ consciously or unconsciously acknow-
leige^which gives to the endless task of science "its necessary
and sufficient warrant and encouragement." ^
2. Difficulties of knowing Other ^ind
Through our experiences of Nature and human extremity we wake
to the fact that there must be another vlnd outside of ourselves.
But can we know this other mind? About this question has raged
one of the greatest battles of all philosophy.
Hy first avenue of approach to other mind is through the
physical medium. But "I have no organ for the experiencing of
other mind: by the nature of other mind I could have none." There
may be more intimate relations and less intimate relations, but
none of these reach the mind; it is l«ft an impenetrable monad.
Others have spoken of certain s igns of being, infa ll ible cr it er la
by which I become aware of the presence of another mind. But
these also fail to give me any any direct experience of that mind.
A third way is simply to a eknowledge the pre- mce of other mind
because I see that my relationship with others doe3 carry a certain
meaning and value to me. Eut all these act on the common pre-
supposition that mind is "furnished in advance with an idea of
an Other rind. " 1 5
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Thus we find a degree of inaccessibility in any. field in which
we search for knowledge of Other Mind, '"hat then is tm .lature of
the knowledge which we desire? Is it not just this: u/e. must have
nothing less than that knowledge which seems at present to he im-
possible: namely, the knowledge of another mind.
It will not aid us in gaining a knowledge of Other Mind to
divorce it from nature.
3. Knowledge of God through nature
We have not the slightest, notion of how Mind in the abstract
could communicate with mind in the abstract. "Reality cannot de-
tach itself from the experience of Mature." Man' s knowledge begins
at the periphery of things, at the point wher:- he makes empirical
contact with : T ture.
Both nature and time which seem to resist the progress of
knowledge are seen to be the only culture in which idea can possibly
develop. They are the necessary forms in which Mind makes contact
with mind. The body is well known to be a symbol of the mind. But
it is more than that. It is "an incredibly intricate and exact
metaphor of every inn^.r movement of that Other Wind w ; even this
does not tell the whole truth for the "body, if we take it so, is
little else than the soul made visible". Upon this well nigh
complete idealization of space and time Professor Hocking comments
further.
"I confess that this extraordinary device^Dy which the
nther Mind presents itself in the guise of a body in the
midst of Nature seems to me each time I think of it more
wonderful than before. The inseparable union of two things
so disparate as social experience and experience of Mature
seem to be: is there not a perpetual amazement in this?
Nature and the natural body must belong with the experience
of Oth^r Mind, even in its ideal condition." 17
0
4. Knowledge as the fruit of experience
^e have been assured that if knowledge is to be found any-
wher- it is to be found in experience. The question we must ans-
wer is this: How can the experience of nature impress us with the
assurance that it is true, and not illusion or purely subjective?
If we were able^)frshow that this social experience was +/eT>t<L~~
'Cal with ourselves and valid there; (2) then to show that it was
independent of ourselves and valid there- it would look as though
one had come about as near a proof of the impossible as he could.
This, as I understand it, is what Professor Hocking attempts to do. 1
a. Nature a3 ground and presupposition of all experience
'"hen we reflect upon the subject of consciousness it seems that
the prespnt world is as much an inseparable part of consciousness
as is the self. Nature seems to be always with me in a way that
other beings are no^ but when another being has once come into my
consciousness hi3 absence from mind is not a loss to my social
consciousness: he has come to stay. The inference here that there
wa3 a beginning to social consciousness is only apparent. The wnole
system of consciousness in its three aspect s--se If , nature and other
mind--ls interlocking and complete. The end is anticipated from
the beginning, in terms of the logic of communication; namely;
"In order that any two beings should establish communion, they must
already have something in common." We have the privilege of reduc-
ing our problem to this alternative: "Social experience is either
always present or never present". f?
We see thll more clearly when we note that the only way we
can Judge social experience Ifl by a Judgment which itself is an
added social exoerience. Leibnitz stepped out of his impenetrable

armor long, enough to pass judgment on the rest of the monads not so
highly favored. It is utterly impossible for us to conceive of
ourselves as mentally alone in the cosmos. If the idea of Other
Mind cannot be tested neither can it he withdrawn. Thus my idea
of Other "'ind is equivalent to experience of Other Mind. "This
idea," he says, "is not prior to experience but le indeed. prior to
all further social experience." I cannot pass judgment open self
as "being absent from the self; thus the copy theory falls for
wanted evidence. Consciousness is ever with me and every Judgment
is but added experience. This argument of Professor Hocking seems
to me to be almost the exact duplicate of Dr. Eowne's illuminating
insight that "the categories of thought do not explain intelligence
"but are explained "by it." Dr. Knu.lson considers this one of the
on
greatest and most necessary of all philosophical insights.
5- Nature as independent of consciousness
Though it is impossible to conceive myself as independent of
Nature, yet Nature has a persistent way of apoearlng totally inde-
pendent of me. It was before me and so far as I can see it -vill
continue after my disappearance. To accept this bit of natural
realism unconditionally would be virtually to deny the possibility
of exoerience, for pure solitude if possible is perpetual. The
truth which natural realism forces uoon me here is that an outer-
objective world does exist--that it affects me; cre.tes me, in fact.
I am not resoonsible for my existence in it nor for the forms under
which I perceive it. "pace and time I accept as they are given.
'tfhat natural realism falls to see is not that the empirical
world is not illusory; rather^tnat in and for itself it is not
final. Neither natural realism nor subjective idealism will solvei
the problem presented by experience. I seek an Other Mind in and
it
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through which I exist, an ^ther Mind also which communicates itself
to me as Nature. 'r e reach beyond our natural realism to a Realism
of the Absolute. 21
pp
C. The dialectic of experience
^e are now prepared to make our final assertion as to our
knowledge of God. It is this: God is the one and primary object
of knowledge from which all other knowledge, including knowledge
of man, is derived and secondary.
"It is through the knowledge of r-od that I am able to
know men: not first through the knowledge of men that I am
able to know or imagine p-od. " 23
This knowledge of ^od must then be the one original and cer-
tain fruit of experience, *"e are then empirical knowers of God--
but how? is empirical knowledge sufficient? Bear In mind that
in order for two beings to establish relationship they must al-
ready have something in common. I am an empirical knower of nature.
True. Eut if there are none but empirical knowers in the universe
there can be no social experience; for "if I have any genuine
soc la 1 e xper ience at all, then at some point I do actually know
the Other Mind i_n its knowing that Is, in the address of the
communication to me." We must assume thiSj for, Hocking declares,
"even were there, in addition to all visible passive knowers in
the world, one all comprehensive passive knower^, we should be no
nearer a conscious unity." Thus "our first and fundamental social
experience is an experience of God." Of all knowledge this is the
most certain immediate and essent ial , - -to know an "other Mind
which in creating Nature is also creating me." The dialectic of
exoerience has carried us to knowledge of God which is primary
Oilboth in point of time and value. ^H
0
There are two corollaries of this doctrine wtiich I will merely
note in passing. The first is that we are not independent of
nature but are taken up into it. ^e do not create it.but adopt it.
The second is that we begin as social beings and acquire solitude
rather than beginning as solitary beings to acquire community.
The greatjcentral hypothesis of Professor Hocking's theory of
knowledge is now uncovered. it can scarcely be over emphasized.
It is the keystone to his dialectic of experience. And let us not
forget; it is only in the realm of experience that we can search
for or find Reality.
This to my mind is nothing short of a magnificent attempt to
combine the Hegelian absolute Idealism with the Kantian primacy of
the practical reason. The question is, will it work? I stand and
admire the lofty reach of the argument. I attempt to penetrate its
implications, '^ill the argument stand? In experience I have found
Other Mind, the most real, the one original fsct which experience
gives me. lay I then test this Peality that I have found? Yes.
But hov' shall I test it? It is to be tested as all truth is tested-
in experience . Yore experience is then the test of experience.
Criticism of the dialectic
Professor John T. Russell, of ^illiams College has well
pointed out the grave danger here. There is a question, he says, of
how we 3hall interpret experience. There are at least four dis-
tinct interpretations. There is professor Hocking's own method
that experience is experience of C-od. But the realist with his
common-sense phllosoohy assures us that experience of the world
is nothing more nor less than whatever senses take it to be. To
the sub,} ect ivlst experience of Mature is but sensations of the

mind. To the agnostic or critical monist Reality is neither
nature nor mind "but a third something--an unknowable. J
If Hocking's argument for 'n-od is true is there place for a
distinction between idea and experience? The two can hardly be
identical. if we say they are* we have proved nothing, but merely
described the process of cognitive experience. Obviously this is
not what Professor Hocking intends. Neither does he intend, I am
satisfied, to identify idea and feeling. He is, however, guilty
of being less clear in this matter than he should be. elsewhere
in hi3 discussion he thinks ide a to be so far inseparable from
value as &J>Tnostto justify the statement that there is a region
(that region being religion) where "fact and value coincide:
where there is no idea apart from feeling, as there is no feeling
apart from idea." But in 3plte of this they remain not one fact
but two.
This is the critical pass in the problem of knowledge. I may
believe In the primacy of the practical reason, may believe in the
fundamental trustworthiness of reason, I may even believe in an
Absolute which is all inclusive, but I cannot believe in the identity
of thought and thing. A)ry existence is more than ^od's idea of me.
To say there is an '"organic union" of thought and thing accomplishes
little, for such a union would have to be of the nature of the old
argument for omnlpresencej-^eenter everywhere and circumference
nowhere. And while I might grant that ability to an infinite Tod,
I cannot readily grant it to a finite knower. The nearest I can
come to it is to assert my faith that in some manner--which is
completely beyond my comprehens ion--the two are actually combined
in a unitary ielf, so an to give life its adequate meaning. We

have here fallen "back upon the theory named interaction. I believe
simply because I am able to find facts in the universe which fit
the case as I see it. Faith is the last fact for any philosopher^
whoever he may be. Ferhaps this is what tD.r. Hocking- means to
imply.
There is but one more step in our study of the problem o e'
knowledge. It is to consider some of the forms of argument which
this dialectic of experience has taken in the history of thought.
Q. The ontological argument
Of the three traditional arguments for the existence of God,
only one--the ontological--o f fers any valid proof of God. Even
this argument is not a demonstration. It is but a "clearing of the
mind," an evaluation of the experience of God. ^o find God in ex-
perience is the only possible way of demonstrating his existence.
"For," says Hocking, "my power of recognizing existence is summed
up in the word experience. " For me to prove the existence of God
is but for me to explain the way I discovered God, starting from my
own particular point. Thus in a sense there are as many different
ways as there are starting po lnt s--whos e name is Legion.
1. Weakness of the cosmological argument
Because nature is, a Tod, if there be one, must be able to
account for nature. He must at least be as good as nsture is. He
must be as satisfactory and as permanent as nature. Arguing from
nature we have no logical Justification for applying anything more
than efficient cause to god. If he is only efficient cauae--
Judging by the general unsat isfactoriness of the world--he would be
a very limited Being Indeed. Eut note, our true need of God rests
not on the sufficiency of the world but upon its obvious
t
Insufficiency. Thus the cosmological argument is unsatisfactory
"because it can give us 2 $od. only as efficient as nature, which
would be just as good as no j£Jod at all. This argument is typical,
Hocking thinks of all arguments except the ontological. They
reason that because the world is , ^-od is . The ontological argument
27
reasons that "Because the world is not, iod is."
2. Criticism of the ontological argument
However, it is not so much the idea that the world is not, but
that it is not sel f- sufficient .which forms the basis for asserting
that God i3. The world is illusory, it lacks permanence: yet withal
it is a fact which must be taken into account. Here professor
Hocking does not seem to be sufficiently clear. For even though
this be truej and even though consciousness of the dependence of the
world may have driven the early theologian to the ontological argu-
ment, yet no mention of the world appears in his argument for °Tod.
He asserts that there; is a Tod whether the world exists or not.
^hat Processor Hocking has done here^as Professor Knudson points
out,, is to givS a valuatlonal interpretation to the ontological
argument. a*~>-***JUj the defect in the older form of the ontolog-
ical argument. Pure disinterested logic con never bridge the gap
between idea and reality. But life, whether logical or illogical^
does it constantly. This in the true sense may not be an argument.
It more nearly resembles a simple declaration of faith. And wnether
it be declared or not, it is the element which makes life possible:
it is the element of value. 1Ta^ue is the key which unlocks the door
to life and reality. 2^
While Professor Hocking falls to make this application, he
does nevertneleso realize the inadequacy in the pure logic of the
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older formulation. He introduces feeling. "No for m of the argu-
ment cen be valid which finds God at the level of thought only,
and not at the level of sensation." It is notj "I have an idea
of God, therefore God exists," but rather, HJ have an idea of God,
therefore I have an experience of God." If he were asked the
further question, "Suppose my idea be productive of evil conse-
quences?" "7ould that also be an experience of God? Even my ideas
of God must be tested by their ability to produce value before I
can say that I have had an experience of God. In other word
s
>
all
experience is not ^od- experience . Neither are all alleged ex-
periences of God productive of value. (Gee note on Hocking's
theory o F value, p 72).
£. Concluding the problem of epistemology
Again we wisn to see the extent to which Hocking is in agree-
ment with the p- rsonalist s in his theory of knowledge. Let us see
how he wculi answer the four fundamental questions of epistemology
as presented by Professor ^nudson. 29
(1) Undoubtedly he would affirm the dualism of thought and
thing. Hy idea of God is not God.
(2) As to the creativity of thought, or more precisely, of
worship, we owe, as Professor Brightman has declared, probably more
to Hocking than to any other man. But this creativity of Hocking's
tries not to assume too much. It is a creat ivit y which must acif*-
•^nowledge the existence of its Absolute. Otherwise creativity of
the nsture presented by Pierce would 3et itself up as Itf own
Absolut e--the one Absolute we do not desire, i feel that this is
the place in whicn Hocking's theory of creativity is infinitely
superior. On the other hand, this is not the copy theory which is
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the only recourse of the Absolute Idealist, who virtually denies
freedom. ThSL question hinges closely on one's interpretation of
the meaning of freedom. There can be little genuine freeze?:* from
the standpoint of an absolutist. Yet freedom in any sense comes,
not through independence of the will but tnrough uniting our will
in harmony with the Other Will, and the greater the harmony the
greater the freedom. Our freedom is also such as takes into
account other equally free beings in the universe.
(3) Hocking would affirm the trustworthiness of reason and,
(4) The primacy of the practical reason^as most practical
Christian thinkers have done. Here he adds that great advance
over Kant in that he makes experience itself metaphysically real.
Note on Hocking's theory of value
^
The fundamental basis for all value, according to Hocking's
theory, is to be found in two separate realms,- th.t of feeling,
and that of idea.
"very unconditioned feeling or desire drives on toward its
fulfilment, ^or this feeling, value lies in the achievement of its
end. The peculiarity about feeling is th;_t it ceases immediately
upon the realization of its goal, thus the accompanying value has
no permanency. The satisfaction of the first desire gives rise to
another and so on in endless succession, never reaching beyond
the self.
Idea, the second foundation for value, reaches oat beyond
the self: It is unbounded. Idea contains something of infinity
about it, something beyond mere space and time. Idea seems to
find Reality itself at its center, and this independence of idea
from the self and its transitory feelings, while it may not have
much concern with our Immediate actions, has much to do with the
building of their ends.
In the actual life which we live it is the constant and
organic union of feeling and idea which gives meaning and con-
tent to our existence. But our existence often seems to lack unity.
The desires of life are numerous, -".any of them transitory, and
often seem to be in eternal conflict with one another. If there is
anything in value it must be t nat which satisfies the Whole-self.
Life is filled with ideas, but it moves in general toward some end,
this is its whole- idea. It is very important that we have the right
whole-idea
.
Another difficulty is encountered in the fact that values
change with changing interests and conditions of life, as life
matures values change for U3. Eut value must have something of
permanence and unity about it. Thus the idea of value is depen-
dent upon the idea of a fundamental unity in the ground of existence.
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Any optimism, Hocking contends, demands this degree of
unity. But optimism is difficult in a world where pleasure is
so intermingled with pain. And if we investigate we find that
it is impossible to dissociate pain from value, for the very
achievement of value or happiness has Its pr ice, a byproduct
which itself is most distinctly a dis-tfalue. But man has never
lived as though pain were the last word in pain. Evil is not
taken at its face value, and pain is often the £uardia!\.of values and
a producer of good consequences. Te live as though the good were
eternal and not the evil; as though the evil were essentially
overcomable. In our field of struggle there is something which
points to a supreme power rising above it all,- a non-competing
power in which all values reside. Thus the theory of values rests
upon the idea of the Absolute, a Being of infinite worth, compatible
to every relative danger, in which every change in this world of
becoming finds an adequate answer.
The religious idea and human values are inseparably connected.
It is essentially in worship that man approaches the Thole of
the meaning of existence. It is here that he finds his values.
Through the pperatlon of the principle of alt err. it ion , of which
worship in one phase, man is atole to achieve values in life.
It is in this process that we come in contact with the possibility
of the creativity of values.
One who ipves in an Imperfect world where evil and injustice
abounds, if he begins to reflect upon the monstrous injustices
around him, may revolt against it all. He denies the oower of evil
to overwhelm him and turns to worship ^or escape. Away from the
turmoil is spirit is free to catch sight of new values which
are caoable of overthrowing the evils. This new value- idea he
must then build into life. This is what the Prophet accomplishes.
Hocking calls it the prophetic consciousness; it is the creative
force within each one of us.
Thus the Absolute makes our values both attainable and
adequate, a necessary requirement for any true value. The final
goal of value for any of us is creativity, or re-creat lvity, of
human nature under the guidance of ends which are essentially
both good and permanent. Hocking thinks that if a man wishes to
be truly creative he had Vest seek his goal through religion.
Christianity, alone of all religions, furnishes at/once both the
field and the Instrument for the accomplishment or this end.
t
Conclusion
As Professor Hocking is not a theologian he should not he
Judged on the fact that he leaves outj^cons iderat ions many points of
interest to the philosopher of religion. In places he is so frag-
mentary in his treatment as to leave the reader in uncertainty con-
cerning his true position. Several of his reviewers complain of a
lack of clear and concise summary.
As with other idealists Hocking often fails to do justice "to
the particular and historical in religion".
Taking his philosophy as a whole there are three great systems
from which Hocking draws largely. The first is platonism. The firs
strong touch of this is seen in his doctrine of ideas. They do not
have the same independent reality as Platonic ideas, yet we hear
him speaking of each idea as having a certain "changeless identity",
and being a "center of attachment, for infinite growth of knowledge.
The "whole idea" he tninks is>ever present. He speaks of the idea
of Other "ind which can neither "be tested nor withdrawn. It is thus
an inescapable fact of experience. He would not think that an idea
carried its own guarantee of reality; in fact, idea is the greatest
enenr' of the actual* yet idea has something unique about it. The
basic idea of reality seems to have some present and undeniable
meaning for us.
His second strong touch of Platonism is in his Interest in the
ideality of the ~tate. He pleads for a renewed interest in the
^tate. To him it is not only idealized as symbolic of man. It is
the conserver o^ all human values and furnishes the ideal field
where they may b-come realized. He finds the concept of State

exceedingly fruitful for illustration and analogy.
In Hegelisn idealism and Hegelian logic we find a second
great influence upon Hocking. His dialectic of experience seems
to hold largely to the triadic formula. His first thesis seems to
he natural realism: antithesis, subjective idealism: synthesis, a
certain awareness of other mind. With this as a second thesis and
an antithesis which finds men as empirical knowers, his synthesis
finds them as knowers of the Absolute. He is obviously influenced
by Hegel in his use of the Absolute.
The third element in Hocking which combines with the former-
two is his emphasis on mysticism. This mysticism is in reality one
prong of another triad in his dialectic, the antithesis of which is
the world of exper ience, and the synthesis the "Proohetic Conscious-
ness" or the re-created man. "3$ The^TAo points of the triad are
•v»tfM/7i3^«7 intuit ionalism on the one hand and pragmatism or practical
reason on the other. D. G. Macintosh, of Yale, attacks this whole
dialectic on the ground that the only way we know anything about
Cod is empirically , --through what he does. He feels that
Hocking has made worship primary, while the reverse is the truth.
I have stated these three tendencies at length because they show
the great streams of thought, five or six in numb er, from which he
draws largely.
There are but two further considerations to mention in con-
clusion: his conceptions of ^od and the world, and his conception
of man.
Hocking views GrOd in two ways. ?rom one point of view he is
personal^ from another he is Impersonal. This Impersonal tend-
ency is regarded with disfavor by typical p-rsonaiism; from their
viewpoint it is but a "step into the dark". In his leaning to-
ward a logical unity he blurs the reality of the individual.

personalise In contrast stresses the conception of c ausal ground and
unity.
Macintosh feels that this personal- impersonal conception in-
volves us in eternal unrest "because of the necessity of shifting
"between the two. r-od can scarcely "be both, and to assert merely
that he is is to assert nothing useful. It is only the moral and
pract ics 1 G&p€ct of religion which is of value. Thus, he arg aes we
to
need first, to deepen and clarify our exoerience and second make our
ideas .more empirical and s clent if ic "before we can use the ontolog-
ical argument, but by that time we sLiJf not need the ontological
argument^ for experience will furnish the data for asserting that
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God is. J in defense of docking's impersonal "-od I will merely
say that we must have some form under which we indicate the unex-
plored realms in the being of nrOd. ^or example, is there anything
in our conception of personality sufficient to accDunt for the
creation of phenomenal reality? Creativity as we experience it is
not creativity of nature.
Another and more serious danger of Hocking is his tendency to
deny the reality of the world. His ontological argument states that
^od is because the world is not. Not so. Both Ood and the world
exist: the one as metaphysical, the other as phenomenal reality.
Hocking's theory of man is not in all plsces clear and distinct.
:'an needs to be remade. He falls to respond to the highest and best.
This ism*****, original sin, hi3 fall. Our problem is to discover how
man is to be remade. Fy investigation Hocking finds the instruments
of remaking In the hurasn nature itself. The place where the remaking
is to be accomplished is the field of experience. But he does not
seem to give sufficient acknowledgement to the difficulties which
this remaking encounters.

The Importance which he places upon the primacy Cj the pracr--
fical reason is obvious. We saw ho T'" he concluded that our primary
exoerience was experience of p-od. Experience of nature and other
empirical knowera was Secondary. We also saw how^ through the
principle of alternat ionjth- rophetic consciousness emerged and
man was transformed according to the measure of hi3 original pos-
sibilities .
Hocking's grasp upon truth la clear and strong. His phil-
osophy is invigorating and optimistic. in purpose at least he ig
essentially in agreement with typical personalise. He seeksjfhe
same end but travels a. slightly different path. He is traditional
at times almost to a fault; change, he thinks, is often more
aooarent than real. The religion of the future will be essentially
religion of the past. In man values are crested and conserved,
and the dialectic of experience is the way of life. Our great re-
ligious task Is In remaking human nature.

Summary
In summary we note first that professor Hocking has attempted
to establish a "basis for religion within original human nature. To
do this he does not use the over-worked historical method as does
°tto in his Idea of the Holy. Rather, he seek3 a "basis in a study
of human motivations. The 'will to power' is an expression ,', In part
at least, of a capacity for the realization of values. -'his is the
basis of religious development. He feels that this element of
human nature is best considered as having something of an a priori
significance. Tome have felt this to he that which distinguishes
man from all other animals.
°*ppo:-:ed to this will to power is a contrary force at work.
Man refuses to respond to the highest and best he is capable of.
He begins to pervert and misuse his fundamental instincts. it is
in this wilful mlsdir-ction of the will to power that Hocking finds
whatever meaning there is in the "fall" of man from his original
state and what is commonly known as evil.
The field of experience is the realm in which man must learn
what he is able about nimself and about ^od. The dialectic of ex-
perience progresses by sucfi^sive alternations between the cognitive
and the feeling faculties of man. Each one runs in turn into the
other. All the experiences of life can be grouped about one or the
other of these end points of alternation. Feelings alone are con-
tentless and abstract. They ever strive to express themselves
through ideas. Ideas, on hhe other hand , mis repres eiit them, and tend
to make them formal and lifeless-- a mechanizing process.
The dialectic of experience Is traced by Hocking through many
phases of its expression. It is to be fnund vheT0v€T Society is
found: in art, in education, in punishment, in the theory of Ttate,
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and of Church and "tate. In religion of the more mystical and
worshipful\types this dialectic of experience is found in it
3
purest form. Hocking calls it the principle of alternation. By
a process of world negation and self-negation the mystic approaches
the ^hole. ^his process is known as the negative path. 'Then the
soul is fully prepared -od meets it with a vision of Himself. The
soul, inspired by its vision
}
turns its attention back toward the
world, which it had previously denied, in an effort to work out the
new truth in experience.
'"hen it comes to the theory of the dialectic Hocking finds that
the most immediate experience we have is experience of God. We ex-
perience n
-oa first, his world and individuals oeconi. It is upon
this keystone that the whole theoretical argument rests. And it is
h<=re that the more acute critic will attack him. However, if we
hold the view of immanence held in general by personalist ic phil-
osophers rre cannot essentially disagree with this position. It is
the Immanent ^-od as creator ani sustainer of phenomenal reality
which is the very ground and cause of all empirical experience*" But
though Hocking contends that our primary experience is experience of
G-od, he could scarcely be understood as meaning that the individual
so understands his o-"n experience in all cases.
There is little place for a finite god or polytheistic religion
in Hocking's absolutist ic philosorhy. A correct understanding of the
fundamental worldpnity which leaves room for a "degree of plurality"
fulfills every need which is to be found in the older conception.
Thi3 degree of unity is essential for any true optimistic world view.
Again, we see that Professor Hocking contends for a fundamental per-
sonality in the nature of the absolute. Put I have had occasion to
point out in detail the difference between this conception and that
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of Personalism. '*T e have indicated an essential difference in his
idles of creativity from that hell "by Positivists. They are very
definite on this matter. To them the only kind of creativity that
we know anything about is that of forces at work through blind law.
Professor Hocking agrees with Personalism in finding the element of
creativity essentially in all men. For Hocking, creativity is more
Ay
>
that overeating of a man or the winning of ones immortal it y , but
its greatest work*, is in remaking man.
The prophetic consciousness as described "by Hocking is crea^-
ilvity at its highest . It is with a wholesome attitude that he thus
finds the highest values distinctly within the realm of religion.
\'an's discovery of and resoonse to p-od is his noblest achievement,
his highest possible realization. Interesting also is it to find
that Hacking feels this note of prophet ism to be the final dispos-
ition of the problem of sin. 7r e dispose of sin not "by denying its
existence but by turning ourselves from it
,
refusing to have any
part in it, and coming to full self consciousness through a proper
relatlonshio to Sod.
"orship calls for the transformation of the instincts.
Pemaking of the individual on the basis of a full realization of the
possibilities of original human nsture is required. (ff all earth'
3
religions Christianity alone demands this transformation, professor
Hocking shows how it Serrrarnls the transformation of three of the great
fundamental instincts*- pugnacity, sex-love, and amb it ion-p enling
with the s-JFg^stion that the desire to win siuls is the great and
noble aim of the Instinct of ambition. Again Christianity alon a of
all religions makes possible the realization o p its own demands.
~e saw how it was that in the great outward and upward sweep of
the dialectic of experience there was a G-od who reached down and
•
received the waiting soul, '"ithout this 'last fact' the whole
principle of alternation would he a failure. "7e wish Hocking
had pointed out here that faith alone made this final step an
accomplished fact. And if it is faith which is indispensable
here at the crucial point, might it not likewise be true that
faith is the basis of all knowledge whatever? Though Hocking
does not point this fact out as we wish he might nave done, he
does leaveiposslbility for such an inference. At any rate it is
the Divine aggression which makes Christianity possible. It is
the reaching down of the Almighty into the world of the finite
and the lifting of man to the plane of his transformation, which
alone can satisfy the demands of our existence. The Christian
religion of all religions most fully meets this requirement;
and only thus is it possible to remake human nature, and enable
man to attain those values of eternal worth which his deepest
nature requires.
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